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ABSTRACT
It has been more than 15 years since the U.S. Supreme
Court, in its landmark decision in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid adopted the common law of agency for the
interpretation of the term "employee" in the context of "work
made for hire ". Since then, despite some criticism, the agency test
has become the norm. This paper argues the Supreme Court's
inclination to apply the work for hire doctrine through agency law
is misguided. The agency test, which is based on tort law
principles, is clearly anomalous in the context of copyright law,
which differs significantly from tort law in its underlying
rationales. This paper further argues that, lacking clear
guidelines, the workfor hire case law has failed in its objective to
achieve consistency and certainty.
My proposal is that the "work made for hire" doctrine
should be decided from the vantage point of copyright law. The test
should focus on incentives to create on the one hand and public
access to created works on the other. These are the goals of
copyright law as stated in the Constitution. Thus, the test should
re-interpret the term "employee" in a manner that complies with
the needs of copyright law. Most importantly, "employee" should
be interpreted to give the first entitlement to the party most apt to
achieve the goals of the Constitution: Instead of using agency test
factors such as employee benefits and tax treatment, the courts
should consider factors such as the parties' relative incentive to
create new works, public accessibility, transaction costs, and the
parties relative ability and motivation to disseminate works to the
public. The partnership of individual creativity with the
employer's resources yields a significant engine for creative
production in society. Revising the "work made for hire" test
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would re-align this important issue with the rest of intellectual
property law.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a Professor. As is typical of young
scholars, you are peripatetic: You have taught three years at your
first school, then visited at a more prestigious school, then returned
home for a year, then moved to a third school (even more
prestigious) and so on. Throughout these years you have been
working on a book, and periodically publishing articles relevant to
the book's topic. Your ideas have subtly changed as you have
thought more deeply about the issue. You rework the articles into a
seamless whole. The resulting product is a wonderful monograph,
and the time comes for you to publish it as a book.
You have no trouble finding a top-notch publisher. But lo
and behold, the publisher asks you to get licenses from each of the
three schools! "You're not the copyright holder," says the
publisher. "You wrote these articles as an employee, and doing
scholarship was clearly within your scope of employment."
So you need these licenses, and you think: Maybe the
schools' administrators will be nice and say, "Sure." Or maybe
they'll insist on a share of your royalties. Or maybe the
administration of one of the schools will find your shift in
positions politically abhorrent, and refuse permission altogether.
At the least, the additional complications will slow down the
publication process.
You try to substantiate your position on legal grounds and
you say to the publisher, "Both Judge Posner and Judge
Easterbrook wrote opinions stating that there's a teacher exception
allowing scholars like me to keep my own copyright."1 And the
I In Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (7th Cir. 1987),
Judge Easterbrook explained:
The University concedes in this court that a professor of
mathematics who proves a new theorem in the course of his
employment will own the copyright to his article containing
that proof. This has been the academic tradition since
copyright law began . . . .The tradition covers scholarly
articles and other intellectual property. When Saul Bellow, a
professor at the University of Chicago, writes a novel, he may
keep the royalties.
About a year later, Judge Posner wrote:
Until 1976, the statutory term "work made for hire" was not
defined, and some courts had adopted a 'teacher exception'
whereby academic writing was presumed not to be work made
for hire. The authority for this conclusion was in fact scanty
... but it was scanty not because the merit of the exception
was doubted, but because, on the contrary, virtually no one
questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright
his writings. Although college and university teachers do
academic writing as part of their employment responsibilities
2008-2009
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publisher replies dismissively, "That's just one Circuit's dicta, and
written by judges with virtually a conflict of interest. They're
professors themselves! The statute has no teacher exception, and
the Supreme Court has adopted a test for 'work for hire' that has
little room for either custom or functional analysis. So you better
get those licenses from your schools, or the deal is off.",
2
A hundred different scenarios will show the same pattern:
good sense suggests that an "employee author" owns the copyright,
but the Supreme Court's test in CCNV places ownership of the
copyright elsewhere.
It has been more than 15 years since the Supreme Court, in
its landmark decision, Community for Creative Non- Violence v.
Reid (CCNV) adopted the common law of agency for the
interpretation of the term "employee" in the context of "work made
for hire". Since then, despite some criticism, the agency test has
become the norm. The agency test is clearly anomalous in the
context of copyright law. It is like an untouched island in the sea
of target-oriented legal doctrines driven by the Constitution's
copyright clause. Adopted from other areas of law with different
origins and justifications, particularly tort law, the agency test does
not fit society's needs in this area.
In the following paper, I argue a more appropriate test
should be applied than the current interpretation of the terms
"employee" and "scope of the employment" under the "work made
for hire" doctrine. The test should focus on incentives to create
and public access to created works. These are the goals of
copyright law as stated in the Constitution: "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts. It is inappropriate at best
and counterproductive at worst to use incentives derived from tort
law to shape the "work made for hire" relation. Tort law
incentives focus on risk avoidance, not the creation of new works.
and use their employer's paper, copier, secretarial staff, and
(often) computer facilities in that writing, the universal
assumption and practice was that . . . the right to copyright
such writing belonged to the teacher rather than to the college
or university.
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
2 1 am indebted to Wendy Gordon for this illuminating example.
3 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Some argue that the promotion of science and
useful art is a limitation on Congress's power to enact intellectual property laws.
See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property
Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006).
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The new test should re-interpret the term "employee" in a manner
unique to the needs of copyright law. Most importantly,
"employee" should be interpreted to give the first entitlement to
the party most apt to achieve the goals of the Constitution. Thus,
instead of using agency test factors such as employee benefits and
tax treatment, the test should include factors such as the parties'
relative incentive to create new works, public accessibility,
transaction costs, and the relative ability and motivation to
disseminate works to the public. The partnership of individual
creativity with the investment resources of employers constitutes a
significant engine for creative production in society.5 The "work
made for hire" test should be revised to re-align this crucial area
with the rest of intellectual property law.
I. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE
DOCTRINE: DEFINING THE LEGAL AUTHOR AND THE OWNER OF
THE RIGHTS
Copyright law generally vests initial ownership in the
copyrighted work with the legal author. Unless she assigns her
rights, she is entitled to all the privileges provided by the
Copyright Act. 6  In most cases, the legal author is the "real"
author.7 However, copyright law deviates from "real authorship" in
cases of works "made for hire." According to § 201(b), "[iun the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes
of this title, and . . .owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright. ' ' Parties can contract around this rule and expressly
5 In CCNV, the Court mentions that as of 1955, approximately 40 percent of all
copyright registrations were for works made for hire. The Court also states that
the Copyright Office does not keep more recent statistics on the number of
works for hire registrations. See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 823.
6 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2008). But see id. § 201(c) (caveats forjoint works).
7 By using the term "real author," I mean author in layman's terms.
8 This section is necessary to establish the employer as the initial owner.
Without it, copyright would vest in employees at the moment of fixation and a
written instrument would be required to transfer copyright ownership to the
employer. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989).
The 1976 Copyright Act changed the preexisting rule for allocating the risk of
uncertainty as to whether the copyright belongs to the "buyer" or the "seller".
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810). The pre-
1976 rule had developed to an
almost irrebutable [sic] presumption that any person who paid
another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory
"author" under the "work for hire" doctrine. This presumption
could not be avoided even by showing that the buyer had no
actual right to control the manner of the production of the
2008-2009
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agree in writing otherwise. However, such an agreement does not
change the identity of the legal author9 or the status of the work,
but only the identity of the one who owns the rights.
10
Thus, the identity of the author and often that of the rights'
owner 1 is based on the definition of a "work made for hire" found
in § 101.12 Section 101 divides works "made for hire" into two
categories. In the first category, the work must have been prepared
by an "employee" within the "scope of employment."1 3 In the
second category, works are found to be made for hire when they
are specially ordered or commissioned for use as one or more of
the several categories enumerated in § 101(2) (which can all be
work, because the buyer was thought to maintain the "right" to
control simply by paying for the work and having the power to
refuse to accept it.
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1987). Therefore the class of persons who counted as
"employees" under the copyright statute "was far greater than the class of
regular or formal employees, and well beyond the somewhat extended class of
employees known as 'servants' under agency law." Id.; see also id. at 328
n.8. The 1976 Act changed the legal interpretation of the work made for hire
doctrine. Courts are no longer bound to presume that the employer is the author.
Under the 1976 Act, "the buyers successfully invoking the 'work for hire'
doctrine are 'authors' by operation of law; otherwise, the sellers are the authors
by operation of law. Only the buyers and sellers of works falling with [sic] §
101(2)'s nine categories can decide who will be the statutory author." Id.
9 The identity of the legal author might affect the status of the work and whether
it will be entitled to copyright protection. Thus, for example, if the legal author
is the United States, no copyright protection will be granted.
10 Deciding the status of the work as a "work made for hire" or not has many
legal implications. Thus, under sections 203 and 304 of the Copyright Act, the
author of a work not made for hire has the right to terminate others' rights to that
work between thirty-five and forty years after creation. The "author" of a work
made for hire does not have this ability. This privilege is given only to "real"
authors because the "employer-publisher does not face the same potential
unequal bargaining position as an individual author." Marvel Characters v.
Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 291 (2d Cir. 2002). Moreover, the term of copyright
protection for a work made for hire is also different from the term of protection
provided to real authors. Work made for hire is protected for 95 years from the
date of publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever expires
first, while a work of a "real author" is ordinarily protected by copyright for the
life of the author plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c).
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characterized as collective works) 14 and about which the parties
have expressly agreed in writing that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire.
Since Congress provided no specific definition for the
terms "employee" and "scope of the employment," the question of
authorship and ownership wound up in the courts. The courts, in
turn, have long struggled with the right definition for these terms.
II. SETTING THE NORM: CCNV AND THE ADOPTION OF THE
AGENCY TEST
In 1989, the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari and
ended the controversy over the "right" interpretation of the "work
made for hire" doctrine by adopting the agency test in CCNV.
15
In CCNV, the nonprofit organization Community for
Creative Non-Violence, located in Washington, D.C., contacted
Reid, a sculptor from Baltimore, to make a statue dramatizing the
plight of the homeless. The organization hoped to display the
statue in Washington at the 1985 Christmas pageant.1 6 However,
the parties did not sign a written agreement assigning their
respective rights in the final product. All that they agreed upon,
after several rounds of negotiations, was that the statue would be
made of inexpensive material, that the costs would not exceed
$15,000 and that it would be completed by December 12th, 1985.17
After paying Reid and displaying the statue for a month, CCNV
brought it back to Reid's studio for some minor changes.18 They
planned to take the statue on a tour to raise more money for the
homeless. Reid refused, arguing that the statue was too flimsy to
14 Works falling within the following categories can be contracted to be a work
made for hire:
a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,.... For
the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary
work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary
adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of
introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other
work ....
Id.
15 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
16 Id. at 733
17 Id. at 733-34
1 Id. at 735
2008-2009
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survive the trip. 19 He urged CCNV to make a more durable form of
the statue, but they declined.20 Following these disagreements the
parties filed competing copyrights applications. CCNV brought the
212case to court. 1 Although the district court ruled in their favor22 , the
appellate court ruled for Reid.23
The Supreme Court found that the deciding legal issues in
the case were the definition of "employee" and "scope of
employment., 24 If Reid qualified as an employee and the work fell
into the scope of his employment, the rights to the statue belonged
to CCNV. If not, Reid owned the rights. Noting the absence of a
statutory definition, the Supreme Court opted for the law of agency
definition of "employee," which has since become standard.25
The Court, in a unanimous opinion, primarily justified its
decision on the grounds of congressional intent.26 The Court's
analysis started with the language of the statute. Noting that
"employee" and "scope of employment" are not defined in the
statute, it inferred that Congress intended those terms to have the
"accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law.",27 And
indeed both terms, "employee" and "scope of employment," did
28have a settled meaning under the common law's agency doctrine.
"Employee" and "scope of employment" are terms of art in agency
law, defined respectively by the Restatement (Second) of Agency
sections 220(2) and 228.29
'9 Id. at 735
20 Id. at 735
21 Id. at 735-36
22 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987).
23 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
24 490 U.S. at 750.
25 Id.
26 For the history of the 1976 Copyright Act in the context of work made for hire
see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
27 CCN[V, 490 U.S. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329
(1981)).
28 Id. at 752 n.31.
29
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b)it
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve
the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
9
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The Court found no contradiction in the text of the statute
with the common-law definition: "Nothing in the text of the work
for hire provisions indicates that Congress used the words
'employee' and 'employment' to describe anything other than the
conventional relation of employer and employee." Rather, the
Court found that the common-law definitions fit Congress's
"paramount goal" of "enhancing predictability and certainty of
copyright ownership." 30 Indeed, these terms were well-established
in agency law. Moreover, relying on the Restatement provided one
meaning for the terms across all U.S. jurisdictions. This enhanced
predictability and reflected the policy that "federal statutes are
generally intended to have uniform nationwide application.
'" 31
The Supreme Court considered in detail but ultimately
rejected three other interpretations of "employee," each adopted or
at least considered by one or more of the appellate courts in the
different circuits that have dealt with the issue.
Under "the right to control" test, if the hiring party retains
the right to control the form of the completed work, the hired party
is considered an "employee" and the rights belong to the employer.
The employer does not have to exercise his right at any point in
time but merely retains the right to do so. CCNV advocated this
interpretation because it had exercised significant creative control
over the sculpture.
32
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the
master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far
beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little
actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
30 Id. at 749. See also Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La. v.
Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987).
31CCNV, 490 U.S. at 730 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)).
32 In the process of the statue's creation, several members of the CCNV
organization visited Reid and gave him directions and suggestions, most of
which he accepted. Id. at 734. The Court also noted that Reid sent CCNV's
representatives some early sketches of the work. Id. Although Reid argued that
CCNV asked for the sketches for the purpose of raising money to construct the
sculpture, the CCNV representative testified that the sketches were also required
for the purpose of his approval. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652
F. Supp. 1453, 1455 n.4 (D.D.C. 1987). Moreover, learning from the CCNV's
representatives that the homeless tend to recline on steam grates in order to
warm their bodies and not to sit on them, Reid altered his sketches to contain
only reclining figures. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 734.
2008-2009
10
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 11 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol11/iss1/3
TORT MADE FOR HIRE - RECONSIDERING THE CCNV
CASE
The court rejected the "right to control" test on the grounds
that adopting this test would make § 101(2), the independent
contractor section, redundant. 33 Statutory construction, of course,
eschews an interpretation which renders part of the language of the
law meaningless. 34 Section 101(2) lists nine categories of works,
which are usually prepared under the direction of the employer, for
example: "a part of a motion picture" and "answer material for a
test. 35 These are categories, therefore, in which the employer does
typically have the right to control the outcome of the creative
work. However, if the Court adopted the "right to control"
definition for "employee," § 101(2) would be redundant because a
work such as "answer material for a test" would already be a work
made for hire under § 101(1), the employee section. This was
clearly not Congress' intent because works under § 101(2), like
"answer material for a test," are only considered works made for
hire if they are the subject of a written and signed agreement.36 The
"right to control" test would obviate the requirement of a signed,
written agreement for works in these categories.
37
Moreover, a legitimately independent contractor would be
considered an "employee" as long as the employer retained the
right to control the outcome of the work. Section 101(2), the
independent contractor section, only lists nine categories of work.
However, using the "right to control" definition would effectively
include works outside of these categories as works made for hire
because this independent contractor would be considered an
"employee" and her work a "work made for hire" as long as the
employer retained the "right to control." Thus, the "right to
control" interpretation would essentially broaden the enumerated
categories under section 101 (2). 8
In rejecting the "right to control" test, the Supreme Court
also emphasized the importance of the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act. 39 The Court noted that the Copyright Act of
1976 was the result of two decades of negotiations between
creators and copyright-using industries.40 The statute's two






39 Id. at 743-48.
40 Id. at 743. For elaboration on this historical compromise see Litman, supra
note 26.
11
Jacob: TORT MADE FOR HIRE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 96 (2009)
exclusive ways of defining a work made for hire-using the
employee and independent contractor distinction, and enumerating
nine specific categories under § 101(2)-were a carefully crafted
compromise. Defining "employee" under the "right to control" test
would disrupt the compromise by blurring the boundary between
the two mutually exclusive sections and widening works made for
41hire beyond the enumerated categories.
The Court also rejected the "actual control" test, in which
the hiring party has to actually wield control over the particular
work.42 The "actual control" test had the same flaws as the "right
to control" test. In addition, the Court found that the "actual
control" test did not meet Congress' "paramount goal" of
"enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. 43
Using the "actual control" test, the parties would not know until
late in the process how much control the employer had actually
exercised. As a result, determination of the ownership of the
copyright ahead of time would be practically impossible.44
The third test adopted the narrow definition of a formally
salaried employee. 45 The Court rejected this test because there was
no mention of it in the statute and the parties disagreed regarding
its exact content.46
Although the Supreme Court resolved the "employee"
definition issue in CCNV by referring to the agency test and
section 220(2) of the Restatement,47 it did not reach the second
41 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 747-48.
42 Id. at 742.
41 Id. at 749.
44 Id. at 750.
45 Id. at 739.
46 Id. at 743 n.8.
47
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or
an independent contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which,
by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of
the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation,
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular
occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the
person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of
the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the
2008-2009
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issue: "scope of employment" in any detail. 48 The Court merely
suggested that the right interpretation should be based upon the
definition provided by the Restatement (Second) of Agency
section 228 (1958). As a result, the Court only dealt with half of
the "work made for hire" inquiry. Only if a hired worker meets the
definition of "employee" and the work is made during the
employee's scope of employment, does the employer get the
rights.
A. Applying the Agency Test
Section 220(2) of the Restatement, to which the Supreme
Court referred, gives a well-articulated definition of both employee
and private contractor. 49 In particular, this section enumerates a
non-exclusive list of factors to distinguish between the two. The
list, as described by the Supreme Court, contains the following
factors: the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished, the skill required to perform
the work, the source of the instrumentalities and tools used to
create the work, location of the work (where is the actual location
of the "production"), the duration of the relationship between the
parties; the right to assign additional projects to the hired party, the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work, the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants, whether the work is part of the regular business
of the hiring party, whether the hiring party is in business, the
provision of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of the hired
party. 50 The Court emphasized that none of these factors is
determinative.
51
Applying these factors to CCNV, the Supreme Court
decided that Reid was not an employee but an independent
contractor. 52 Although CCNV directed Reid's work to ensure the
statue met their specifications, the Court held that this factor was
parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
48 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751.
49 See supra note 47.
50 CCV, 490 U.S. at 751-52. Note that this list differs from the factors in
Restatement Section 220(2).
51 Id. at 752.
52 id.
13
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not dispositive. 53 All of the other factors were in Reid's favor and
weighed against considering him an employee. 54 Reid had a skilled
occupation. He supplied his own tools while working at his own
studio. 55  Since his studio was located in another city daily
supervision was practically impossible. 56 Reid was hired for only a
short period of time - less than two months - and CCNV did not
retain any right to assign him additional projects.57 CCNV paid
Reid a lump sum only upon completion of the work and, but for
the deadline,58 Reid had the absolute freedom over when and how
long to work.59 The court added that CCNV was not in the
business of creating sculptures, in fact they were not a business at
all.60 Finally, the court pointed to the fact that Reid was not on
CCNV's pay roll: it did not pay his social security taxes, nor paid
or contributed to any employee benefits or workers' compensations
funds.61
One of the key contradictions in the Supreme Court's test-
the lack of uniformity of the agency law test - is apparent in the
CCNV decision itself. Although the Court emphasized uniformity
among the states, predictability, and certainty as some of the most
important arguments for adopting the agency test, it departed from
the Restatement even on this very first case. The Court omitted
some Restatement factors and introduced others not included in the
Restatement. The new factors were the following: the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; and the provision of
employee benefits and tax treatment of the hired party. 62 In adding
these new factors, the Supreme Court referred to other cases that





57 Id. at 752-53




62 Id. at 751-52.
63 For cases considering the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and
how long to work, see A[LRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258
(1968); Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989); and Short
2008-2009
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it is not at all clear that these other cases used these factors in the
context of agency, 64 or that these factors have any tradition (either
long or short) of being considered part of the agency test. At the
same time, the Court omitted the following factors mentioned in
the Restatement: whether or not the hired party is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; and whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relations of master and servant. 65
The court then compounded problems of dis-uniformity by
declaring that the Restatement's list was non-exhaustive and that
none of the factors was determinative. This opened the door to
other courts to add and subtract factors without any specific
guidelines on when or how to do so. Thus, elements which the
Supreme Court omitted were later considered by other courts;
while other elements which the Supreme Court considered, were
ignored by later courts. As a result, this test and its interpretation
by the courts could not, as I will demonstrate later on, achieve the
goals of uniformity, predictability and certainty that the Supreme
Court gave as justifying its holding in CCNV.
B. Later Interpretations by the Courts - the Evolution
of the Agency Test
Since the CCNV case, courts have relied upon the
Restatement's criteria in order to decide the status of the hired
party. At the same time, however, the courts have interpreted the
CCNV test in different ways, adding and subtracting factors from
the original test and substantially changing the weight of each
factor. One of the test's most appealing aspects to the Supreme
Court - the idea that it would be applied uniformly in all the
v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 574 (8th Cir.
1984). For cases considering the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants, see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947); United States
v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717, 719 (1947); Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986); and Short, 729 F.2d. at 574. For cases
considering the provision of employee benefits, see United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at
259; Dumas, 865 F.2d. at 1105; Short, 729 F.2d. at 574. For cases considering
the tax treatment of the hired party, see Dumas, 865 F.2d. at 1105.
64 For instance, in Dumas, the court refers to the formal salary test (and not to
the agency test) to solve ambiguities. "By defining "employee" to cover only
formal, salaried employees, few disputes should arise as to the status of the
artist. Where the artist holds himself or herself out as a freelancer, the employer
should anticipate that the commissioned work will not be a work for hire under §
101(1)." 865 F.2d. at 1105.
65 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
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federal circuits - has not been achieved, either among different
jurisdictions or within any given circuit.
It seems some courts are not aware that they are applying
or even creating new tests, while others are aware, but continue the
practice because there are no guidelines as to the required
outcome. Courts reshape the test in almost every case by adapting
it, in a very fact-sensitive manner, to the unique circumstances of
the case before them. Several patterns of applying the agency test
have evolved. These patterns, however, are not unique to
copyright law. The same patterns are apparent across all the areas
of law in which the agency test is applied, including labor law and
tax law. 66 This alone indicates the extent to which application of
the agency test to works "made for hire" is not guided by
principles of copyright law.
One recurring pattern is that courts do not adequately
emphasize- and often neglect completely - the different interests
underlying the various areas of the law. Judges mix and match
precedents from a wide variety of legal fields. Some courts,
however, do realize these differences and try to create a test within
the test that better fits their case, explaining why some factors are
not relevant or at least should weigh less than in other areas of law.
This, however, creates many sets of tests. Other courts favor and
even endorse cross-field interpretations, reasoning that these yield
outcomes that are more just and therefore should be adopted to
satisfy the uniformity and predictability goals of the interpretation
process.
67
Three opinions in particular: Aymes v. Bonelli,68 Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc. ,69 and Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation &
Storage,70 recognize and attempt to solve the difficulties arising
66 The common law test has been used to decide the employee status in a number
of congressional acts. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v.
Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2003) (Americans with Disabilities Act); Lerohl v.
Friends of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); Kemether
v. Penn. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(gender based discrimination under Title VII); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec.,
516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995) (National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. United Ins.
Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (same); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 319-20 (1992) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); S. Rep.
No. 80-1255, at 1-2 (1948) ("[T]he usual common-law rules, realistically
applied, shall continue to be used to determine whether a person is an 'employee'
for purposes of applying the Social Security Act."); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1
C.B. 296 (Revenue Act of 1978).
67 For discussion see infra Part V.
68 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
69 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
70 237 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
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from the application of the agency test in the work made for hire
area.71 Their criticisms and differing conclusions alone indicate the
extent of the difficulty of providing a coherent and predictable
interpretation of the "employee" and "scope of employment"
factors.
In Aymes, the Second Circuit directly addressed the
problem caused by the Supreme Court's lack of guidance on how
to weigh the different CCNV factors. 72 The court noted: the
"[CCNV] test can be easily misapplied, since it consists merely of
a list of possible considerations that may or may not be relevant in
a given case." 73 Criticizing the CCNV test, the court observed that
the courts were not given direction on how to weigh the factors.
74
The Aymes court tried to rectify the problem by giving its own
guidance.75  It first noted that, although the Supreme Court
emphasized that no one factor is decisive, this does not mean that
all factors are equally important, or indeed that all factors bear
relevance to the case. 76 The court set the following rule of thumb:
Some factors ... will often have little or no
significance in determining whether a party is an
independent contractor or an employee. In contrast,
there are some factors that will be significant in
virtually every situation. These include: (1) the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means
of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision
of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the
hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired
party.
77
These factors, the court reasoned, will almost always be relevant
and should be given more weight in the analysis, because they are
usually highly probative of the true nature of the employment
relationship.
71 It should be noted that all three cases were decided by the Second Circuit.





77 Graham v. James is an example of the use of this "narrow test" in the context
of copyright law. 144 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1998). Using the "narrow test," the court
ruled that the hired person was an independent contractor. ld. at 235.
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In Carter, the court agreed that the CCNV test is easily
misapplied. 78 The court also found that, while all of CCNV's
factors are relevant, no single factor is determinative. 79 Moreover,
the court noted that the CCNV test is a list of factors not all of
which may come into play in a given case and the factors that do
come into play should be weighed by reference to the facts of the
given case.
80
Taking the Aymes interpretation to the extreme (in a non-
copyright case), the court in Eisenberg,81 suggested that, in
balancing the CCNV factors, the court must disregard those factors
that, in light of the facts of a particular case, are (1) irrelevant or
(2) of "indeterminate" weight - namely those factors that are
essentially in equipoise and thus do not meaningfully cut in favor
of either the conclusion that the worker is an employee or the
conclusion that she is an independent contractor. 82
This time, the court ruled that "the 'greatest emphasis'
should be placed on the first factor" - the right to control the
manner and means by which the work is accomplished.
83
Moreover, the court argued that, in different areas of law, the
agency test indeed shares a common name but is a de facto
different test. Specifically, the Second Circuit judge deciding
Eisenberg criticized the district court for inadequately emphasizing
the first CCNV factor and for over emphasizing the employee
benefits and tax treatment factors. 84 Judge Cabranes justified
weighing the factors differently than in Aymes, which had been
decided by the same circuit court, by noting that the court had
never applied the five-factor Aymes test outside the copyright
context. 85 Declining to presumptively consider the five Aymes
factors more significant in Eisenberg, the court pointed out the
considerable difference between the work-for-hire doctrine and
anti-discrimination laws. 86
78 71 F.3d at 85.
79 Id.
81 Id. at 87-88.
81 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, 237 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
82 Id. at 114.
83 id.
84 ld. at 115-16.
85 id.
86 The legal question the court had to answer in Eisenberg was whether the
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In so saying, the court acknowledged the fact that there is
no one agency test and that the courts would probably reach
different results when considering various fields of law.87 The
Second Circuit justified its decision by noting that emphasizing
employee's benefits and tax treatment enables the parties to work
around the definition of an employee, changing the status of the
hired party from employee to private contractor at their
discretion.88 While in copyright law this result is acceptable, such
flexibility does not fit other areas of the law. In copyright issues,
courts can rely more heavily on contractual terms when
determining the status of the work and its legal author for
copyright purposes. However, the right to be treated in a
nondiscriminatory manner in labor law, for example, cannot
depend upon the terms of any particular contract but is instead
guaranteed by "public law." Therefore, the contract plays a much
smaller role in the courts' decisions outside the copyright context.
In Judge Cabranes' words, "A firm cannot buy from a worker an
exemption from the substantive protections of the anti-
discrimination laws because workers do not have such an
exemption to sell, and any contractual term that purports to confer
such an exemption is invalid..." 89 The court summed up saying
that in anti-discrimination cases, courts should not ordinarily place
extra weight on the benefits and tax treatment factors enumerated
in CCNV, and should "instead place special weight on the extent to
which the hiring party controls the 'manner and means' by which
the worker completes her assigned tasks."
90
In short, unlike other doctrines of copyright law, where the
list of deciding factors is set and their application is to a great
extent predictable, 91 in the area of "work made for hire," the level
87 The Eisenberg court specifically compared copyright law and anti-
discrimination law. Id. at 115-16.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 117. The court also adds the following: "the core, substantive
protections of the antidiscrimination laws were not intended to be skirted by the
terms of individual employment contracts even if on their face those terms
concern only the compensation of a worker." Id. One problem with Judge
Cabranes's reference to anti-discrimination laws is that intellectual property law
is not only concerned with the parties themselves, but also with society's strong
interest in accessing and producing these works. Therefore, the default rule in
copyright law should also include "public" law and society's general concerns.
See e.g., Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright, 61 U.T. FAC.
L. REV. 1 (2003).
90 Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 117.
91 For instance, the Fair Use doctrine. Notice however, that even with regard to
the Fair Use doctrine, many legal scholars will argue that the applicable standard
is too vague and can be manipulated by the courts to reach different outcomes.
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of unpredictability is high. The list of relevant factors and their
weight is so unsettled and the cases litigated under this doctrine are
so fact sensitive that "there is no way to predict what a court will
hold., 92 In fact, sometimes it seems that the most influential factor
is the court's sympathy towards the working artist. 93
C. Scope of the Employment
The interpretation of the term "scope of the employment"
adds another layer of complication to this already complex issue.
To begin with, the court in CCNV itself mentioned section 228 of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency but did not give any
indication on how to apply it in the context of copyright law.
94
Furthermore, later decisions have struggled with the Restatement's
interpretation of "scope of the employment". It seems the
difficulties have stemmed primarily from the inadequacy of the
Restatement's definition - and secondarily from the lack of a
guiding star on the horizon, an end according to which judges
could modify the test to get right and uniform results.
Section 228 contains a general definition of "scope of
employment," 95 providing the terms under which conduct falls
within or without the scope of the employment. This definition is
See e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA
L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2008) ("[U]sers are often deterred from engaging in
conduct that likely would fall within the ambit of fair use, due in part to ... the
uncertainty and unpredictability of fair use doctrine"); Pierre N. Leval, Toward
a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1990) (pointing out
that neither the decisions that have applied the fair use doctrine nor its eventual
statutory formulation, "undertook to define or explain its contours or
objectives"); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair, A Comment on the Fair Use
Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (questioning whether "the
results in concrete cases can be made predictably responsive to a limited set of
definite principles certainly not large, general principles and not very often
even more specific, intermediate ones").
92 Jonathan H. Spadt, Work Made for Higher Understanding of the Copyright
Act of 1976: Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 4
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 223 (1997).
93 id.
94 A careful reading of the Court's opinion shows that the Court does not
actively endorse the interpretation of section 228. CCAV, 490 U.S. 730, 740
(1989). Instead, the Court simply mentions that "Congress' intent to incorporate
the agency law definition is suggested by the use of 'scope of employment,' a
widely used term of art in agency law." Id. (emphasis added).
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
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found in a sub chapter of Title B which deals with the "Torts of
Servants".
96
Subsection 1 of section 228 enumerates 4 conjunctive
conditions with which conduct must comply in order to fall within
the scope of the employment. Conduct will be considered within
the scope of the employment if and only if it is the kind of conduct
the servant is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within
the authorized time and space limits; and it is actuated, at least in
part, by the purpose to serve the master. The fourth condition deals
with cases in which the servant intentionally used force against a
third party, a consideration hardly relevant to copyright.97
Subsection 2 refers to the cases in which conduct does not
fall within the scope of the employment. According to section 2 the
act/conduct will not fall within this scope if it is different in kind
from the conduct that was authorized, far beyond the authorized
time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.
The Restatement's comment adds a few other subtleties,
such as the fact that sometimes the master may be liable for acts
not within the scope of the employment 98 or that it is possible to be
liable for the acts of someone who is not a servant, for example,
when the appearance of service misleads a third party.
99
Moreover, Comment c of the Restatement adds an important
caveat which is based on section 220. According to this comment
there is no liability for the conduct of one who, despite being a
"servant," performs other service or work over which the master
has no control or which the master has no right to control. 100
In the early cases following the CCNV decision, it is easy to
see the difficulties courts had in implementing the test and
deciding the scope of its application. The courts could not use the
Section 228 definition as is because part of it was, on its face,
irrelevant to copyright law. Therefore, courts had to reshape the
tests at least to some extent.
96 Remember that one can only make use of "scope of employment" test after
establishing that the hired party is an "employee."
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
9' Id. at §§ 212-14.
99 Id. at §§ 265-67.
... Id. at § 228 cmt. c (1958).
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1. Miller and Roeslin: A Case Study of
Inconsistency in Application of the Agency Test
The confusion is clearly apparent in two post-CCNV
decisions with almost identical facts and opposite conclusions:
Roeslin v. District of Columbia10 and Miller v. CP Chemicals,
Inc.
10 2
In both cases, the plaintiffs were clearly "employees," so
the issue at stake was whether the plaintiffs work fell into their
"scope of employment." Although neither plaintiff was employed
as a computer programmer,' 0 3 both developed computer programs
to help them perform tasks at work more efficiently.' 0 4 Each spent
many hours at home on their own computers developing these
programs. 105 In Miller, the court emphasized that the plaintiff
performed most of the program development at home, on his own
time, and although he was an employee paid by the hour, he never
requested or received overtime payment for this work.10 6 In
Roeslin, most of the work was also done at home, although some
of the testing and debugging took place during office hours
because the plaintiff brought each module to work to test it with
real data. 10 7 Here too, the plaintiff received no compensation for
the time he spent developing the new program even though his
employer used his system when it was completed. 10 8 In both cases,
there was no explicit contract that assigned the rights. 10 9 The
question posed in both cases was the same: who should get the
software copyright?
The Miller court found for the employer after going
through the Section 228 factors referred to by CCNV.110 Regarding
101 921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995).
102 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
103 The Miller plaintiff analyzed chemical products to ensure conformance with
customer specifications, and the Roeslin plaintiff worked in collecting and
tabulating employment statistics. Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 795; Miller, 808 F.
Supp. at 1240.
104 Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 796; Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1240.
105 Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 796; Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1240, 1242.
106 808 F. Supp. at 1240, 1242.
107 921 F. Supp. at 796.
108 id.
109 Id. at 795-96; Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1240, 1242.
110 808 F. Supp. at 1243.
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the first factor, whether the work was "of the kind [the employee]
is employed to perform," the court held program development was
"at least incidental" to the employee's job and therefore within the
scope of his employment.111 The court drew the "incidental"
standard from section 229 of the Restatement of Agency, comment
b, 112 which states that work incidental to the employee's job is
within her scope of employment. Comment b defines incidental as:
"within the ultimate objective of the principal and an act which is it
not unlikely that such a servant might do."' 11 3 Here, the court
reasoned that the computer program helped the employee to do his
job and that developing the program was closely related to the
other work he did.
114
Using the same reasoning, the court found that the
employee's work met the third factor: that "it was actuated, at least
in part, by a purpose to serve the master." '11 5 The court considered
that Miller was motivated by a wish to simplify his job and to
eliminate errors from which both Miller and the employer
benefited. 116 Finally, even though the employee worked at home
for no extra pay, the court found that the program development met
the second factor: "substantially within the authorized time and
space limits" simply because the plaintiff worked for the employer
Id. at 1243-44.
112 An act may be incidental to an authorized act, although considered
separately, if it is an entirely different kind of an act. To be incidental,
however, it must be one which is subordinate to or pertinent to an act
which the servant is employed to perform. It must be within the
ultimate objective of the principal and an act which is not unlikely
that such a servant might do. The fact that a particular employer has
no reason to expect the particular servant to perform the act is not
conclusive. Although an act is a means of accomplishing an
authorized result, it may be done in so outrageous or whimsical
manner that it is not within the scope of employment. An assault by
one employed to recapture a chattel, while entirely different from the
act which he was employed to do, which was merely to take
possession of the chattel, may be within the scope of employment,
unless committed with such violence that it bears no relation to the
simple aggression which was reasonably foreseeable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. b (1958).
113 id.
114 Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243
115 Id. at 1243-44.
116 The court does not provide details on how it was in the employer's favor. The
court does mention, however, that the ultimate purpose of the development of
the computer program was to benefit the employer by maximizing the efficiency
of the operation of the quality control lab.
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during the time of the development. 1 7 The court did not apply the
fourth element (the intentional tort) of the scope of the
employment test because the judges found it irrelevant. 1 8
In stark contrast, the court in Roeslin ruled in favor of the
plaintiff based on application of the same test. 119 Considering the
first factor, the court concluded that developing computer software
was not the "kind of work" the plaintiff was employed to
perform. 120 The court concluded that while developing the new
system did help the functioning of the workplace, computer
programming was in no way part of his job description.1 2 1 Even
using the "incidental" test from section 229, the court found
computer programming was not the kind of work commonly
performed by other labor economists and that it was unlikely that
the plaintiff would engage in such an activity. 22 The second factor
was decided in favor of the employee because he spent 3,000 hours
at home working on a computer he bought with his own money.
123
With regard to the third factor, the plaintiff testified that he
developed the program in order to create job opportunities for
himself and to prove it could be done. 124 The court observed that,
even though the system also benefited the employer and the court
could fairly infer that part of the plaintiff's motivation was to
achieve the employer's benefit, the employee was "primarily
motivated" by personal goals.1 25 Therefore, the employee's work
fell outside the scope of section 228.
The contradictory results in Miller and Roeslin demonstrate
the inadequacy of the test suggested in CCNV, in terms of
consistency and ease of application. Using the agency definition
for "scope of employment" simply applies the wrong tool. The tort
law factors do not work well in the copyright setting; it is like
using a spoon to cut a piece of paper. As I will later elaborate, what
makes perfect sense in the context of tort law does not necessarily
apply to the realm of copyrights. The intrinsic logic in these two
areas is not the same. In Roeslin and Miller, the employees
117 808 F. Supp. at 1243.
118 id.
119 921 F. Supp. at 797-99.
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produced new creative works entirely at their own initiative with
no input or guidance from the employer. However, the agency
definition of "scope of employment" does not require that a court
give weight to these considerations.
The Miller court's struggle to reconcile agency law with
copyright principles 126 clearly reflects a bad fit. Miller was one of
the first decisions which followed the Supreme Court's decision in
CCNV. The second factor, "substantially within the authorized
time and space limits," proved particularly difficult for the Miller
court to apply to a copyright case. The court admitted that most of
Miller's work was done at home, in his spare time, for no
additional pay. 2 7 The court concluded, however, that the work was
within the scope of employment if the employee's driving force to
do the work was directly related to a specific product of the
employer and the employee's responsibilities at work, and the
work was for the primary benefit of the employer. 128 If the
employee performed the work with this purpose, then the work
was "substantially within the authorized time and space limits"
even if an hourly employee worked outside the workplace without
additional compensation. 
129
It is hard to see how one could reach this conclusion just
from the Restatement's second factor.1 30 Clearly, the Miller court's
interpretation of the second element departed significantly from the
Restatement's black letter definition. However, the court's
conclusion is less surprising when one considers that it based its
decision on Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, 131 which took a very
different approach to works made for hire than the Supreme Court
in CCNV. Marshall was a pre-CCNV case which dealt with the
copyright ownership of an article written by an employee. Ruling
for the employer, the Marshall court found that although the article
was not written while the employee was at work or at the direct
request of the employer, the creation of the work was nevertheless
within the scope of the employment. 32 The court in Marshall
emphasized the fact that the employer was the direct cause of the
126 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
127 Id. at 1243. In the court's words, the work was done "primarily, if not
entirely" at home. Id.
128 1 Id. at 1244.
129 Id.
130 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. e (1958).
131 647 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
132 Id. at 1331.
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preparation of the work and had a right to control or supervise its
creation. 33 This approach, as discussed above, was rejected by the
Supreme Court in CCNV.134 Despite the fact that the court in
Miller found the facts in Marshall to be more readily identifiable
with common notions of "the scope of employment," it still
decided for the employer.' 35 Thus, the Miller court's interpretation
of the second element is an uneasy amalgamation of agency law
and the old "right to control" test.
Miller, and its confusing combination of tests, is important
because the court's interpretation set the ground for other courts to
follow and was often cited by other courts.
2. The Courts' Continuing Difficulties in Applying
the Agency Test
In Favela v. Fritz Companies, Inc. ,136 the court followed
the Miller definition by finding that, in determining the scope of
employment, the court should only take into consideration the first
three factors of section 228.137 In Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,138
the appellate court also accepted the Miller definition, but, in
addition, adopted the notion that when the first element of the
Restatement test is met, the courts should not grant authorship
rights to employees solely because the work was done at home, off
hours. 139 Basing their approach on Miller,140 courts have reduced
the importance of the second element and essentially have
disregarded it altogether, establishing the scope of the employment
with only the first and third factors.
Interestingly though, the district court in Avtec, in a follow-
up procedure between the parties, 14 departed from the circuit
court's decision and reestablished the Restatement's three elements
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1330. Moreover, in Marshall the employer had a higher degree of
control than that in Miller. Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1244.
135 Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1244.
136 No. 92-2450, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20199, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1993).
137 Id. at *6.
13821 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994).
139 Id. at 571.
140 As well as in Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, 647 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ind.
1986), which is a pre-CCNV decision.
141 Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16946 (D. Va. 1994).
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test. 142 Here again, the district court showed its discontent with the
application of tort principles to copyright law, noting that
"[o]bviously the application of common law principles developed
primarily through tort law are difficult to utilize in determining the
issue of copyright ownership."' 143 The court, however, saw no other
choice but to apply those principals because the Copyright Act of
1976 does not mention any other applicable principles.
Given these constraints, the district court in Avtec
attempted to refine the scope of the employment test.1 44 First, it
restated the fact that the fourth element in section 228 is not
applicable to the issue of copyright ownership since both this
section and sections 229-236145 appear to have been developed
primarily in relation to a master's liability in torts for the
negligence of its servant. 146 Then, the court added that not only is
section 228(1)(d) inapplicable but neither are sections 230, 231 and
234.147 In addition, Section 232 appeared to have limited, if any,
application. 148 On the other hand, the court mentioned the
importance of section 233, a section which is parallel to and further
142 Id. at *10. The court decided in favor of the employee based primarily on the
second element. The court made it clear that it reached its conclusion
notwithstanding that some courts have found work to be work made for hire
even when it was created at home during odd hours. This was approved by the
appellate court. Later cases also ruled in the employee's favor when the vast
majority of the work was made at home and during off hours. See Roeslin, 921
F. Supp. at 798.
143 Avtec, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16946, at *12 n.6.
144 Id. at *8.
145 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 229-36. Sections 229
through 236 add more specifics to the general "scope of the employment"
definition in section 228. Section 229 deals with the relationships between
authorized and unauthorized conduct and when such unauthorized conduct can
yet fall within the scope of the employment. Section 230 deals with forbidden
acts that although forbidden, may nevertheless fall within the scope of the
employment. Similarly, section 231 deals with criminal or tortious acts. Section
232 deals with omissions and cases in which the employee's failure to act can
make the employer liable. Section 233 deals with the time of the service while
section 234 deals with its area. The last two sections 235 and 236 handle a
conduct that is not for the purpose of serving the employer and a conduct with
dual purpose (that is, it serves both the employer and the servant or a third party,
respectively).
1
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defines 228(1)(b) and portions of 228(2),149 and the importance of
sections 235 and 236,150 which are parallel to and further explain
228(1)(c) and parts of section 228(2). 151 The fact that the Court
found the applicability of the Restatement so inconsistent shows
how complex the test is and why it is impossible for the courts to
get it right.
Other courts, however, have not necessarily followed the
Avtec decision or the Miller decision, preferring to stay squarely
within the framework of section 228. Even so, this does not mean
that section 228 is universally applied in the same or similar
manner. 152 Different courts have different interpretation of its
elements and therefore often get opposite results on similar
facts. 153 At least some of the courts prefer a more narrow
interpretation of section 228 elements. Thus, the kind of work the
hired party is employed to perform is narrowly construed so as not
to include even similar tasks that depart from the job definition.
Similarly, the third element is interpreted by some courts as
emphasizing the employee's motivation and not the outcome of her
acts. By so doing, the court can safely reach a conclusion that,
even though the employer has benefited from the activity, the
employee was not motivated by the employer's benefit and
therefore the third element's requirements were not met.'
54
149 "Conduct of a servant is within the scope of the employment only during a
period which has a reasonable connection with the authorized period."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 233.
150 "An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with
no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of
which he is employed." Id. § 235 (1958). Section 236 adds the following:
"Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to
serve the purposes of the servant or of a third party". RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 236 (1958).
151 Avtec, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16946, at *9 n.5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
152 For example, see the way the court implemented the test in the following
cases: Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir.
2004); Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Genzmer v. Pub.
Health Trust, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Moonstruck Design, LLC
v. Metz, No. 02-4025, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14583 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Roeslin v.
District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995); City of Newark v.
Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3 (D.N.J. 1995); Miller v. CP Chemicals, Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
153 The juxtaposition of Genziner, 219 F. Supp.2d 1275 and Roeslin, 921 F.
Supp. 793, can serve as a good example.
154 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp 625, 634 (S.D. Ind.
1997); Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798.
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Reading these rulings together, one cannot avoid the
conclusion that the courts have no uniform guidelines. Many of the
courts disclose in a rather blatant manner their dissatisfaction with
the test, pointing out to its different roots and the different goals it
aims to pursue. Finding the test inadequate for copyright law, and
themselves powerless to change its required application, courts are
giving inconsistent analysis, both in single decisions and when
compared to others. It seems each case is decided on its merits, in
a very case sensitive manner, according to the subjective sense of
justice of the presiding judge. Courts show internal conflict,
showing a willingness to ignore the last element of section 228 due
to its irrelevancy while at the same time feeling obligated (at least
formally) to apply the other elements.
This state of affairs can be attributed to the discrepancy
between the agency test and general copyright guidelines. Courts
do not apply the incentives-based principles of copyright law
which are dictated by the Constitution and are so prevalent in all
other areas of copyright law because the agency test is not
inherently designed to do so, and the Supreme Court in CCNV
failed to suggest a way to solve the problem.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE UNIFIED AGENCY TEST FOR
INTERPRETING THE TERMS "EMPLOYEE" AND "SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT" IN THE CONTEXT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
To understand the inappropriateness of the Agency test as it
has been manifested by the courts one has to explore the
Restatements' rationales and origins in the law of torts and to
juxtapose them with the underlying rationales of copyright law.
A. The Restatement of Agency in the Context of Tort
Law
Courts have often cited the Restatement when imposing
liability on employers. The general principle, that the master is
subject to liability for torts committed by his servants while acting
in the scope of their employment, is deeply rooted in the common
law tradition. The explanation for this common wisdom is often
the following: "It is because a master has the right to exercise
control over the physical activities of the servant within the time of
service, that he is vicariously liable for the servant's negligent acts
committed within the scope of his employment."'1 55 According to
155 Jones v. Century Oil U.S.A., Inc., 957 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 481 (1970)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Kemether v. Penn. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 15 F. Supp.
2d 740, 748 (D. Pa. 1998).
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the Restatement, this assumption of control is the basis for
imposing tort liability whenever the thing controlled causes
harm. 156 It is true that normally employer culpability is required,
but the Restatement explains that in the law of master and servant
the use of the fiction that "the act of the servant is the act of the
master" has made it seem fair to subject the non-faulty employer to
liability for the negligent and other faulty conduct of his
servants.1 57 The Restatement adds that this idea of responsibility
for harm done by the servant's faulty activities naturally followed
the notion that within the time of service, the master can exercise
control over the physical activities of the servant.
1 58
Still, vicarious liability has its limits. Courts have certainly
been wise enough to realize that, even though the agent might have
continuing obligations to the employer, the master's liability exists
only at certain times.1 59 The injured has the power to subject the
master to liability for the servant's tortious physical conduct only
for conduct occurring in, or reasonably in proximity to, the times
and places when the servant is authorized to perform service.
During other times, with some exceptions, a servant is her own
person, and her acts do not affect her employer. 160
A few explanations are often provided to justify the
concept of vicarious liability. Some courts adopt the explanation
given by the Restatement section 219 comment a according to
which, as a matter of policy, "it would be unjust to permit an
employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without
being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of judgment and the
frailties of those working under his direction and for his
benefit."'1 61 To put it differently, the notion of justice dictates that
if the employer is entitled to the benefits of his employee's work
he should also pay for the damages she imposes. The employee
shifts the risks of her work to the employer: she trades both the
benefits and the costs for a lump sum salary. This makes her
different from an independent contractor who doesn't shift these
risks but carries the burden alone.
156 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 233 (1958).
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
161 Id. § 219 cmt. a (1958). See also Kemether v. Penn. Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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Another explanation is that this liability system minimizes
the costs of accidents and the costs of precautions.162 The
employer, if in control, is in a better position to estimate the risks
involved in the job and to take reasonable precautions to prevent
them.1 63 The employer who is running the entire business is also
less prone to personal bias and is less susceptible to external
pressures.1 64 Therefore, there is a higher chance he will act in a
rational manner. Thus, if the employer carries the costs of the
accident, he will have a better incentive not only to invest in
precautions but also to influence his employees via other means to
act in a prudent manner. This "deterrence" argument is one of the
more prevalent justifications for employer's liability among
instrumentalist theoreticians.
165
Yet another justification emphasizes the superior abilities
of the employer to spread the loss. Since the employer is involved
in a given activity (providing goods, services) he will spread the
costs of the damage among all of those who participate in the
activity. This is "just" because the damage is part of the costs the
activity imposes on society. It is also economically wise because
the accumulation of the aggregated harm from the relatively small
payment imposed on the consumers is less than the harm created
by imposing the entire payment on one person (and in this respect
it does not matter whether it is the injured person or the
employee). 
166
A fourth explanation suggests that the reason for making
the employer liable is that it improves the position of the injured
party. It would be unfair to the injured party to make only the
employee liable because she often does not have sufficient
resources to compensate the victim. Making the employer liable
162 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
163 And for that reason often times the employer will be the cheapest cost
avoider. See id; see also Alon Harel & Assaf Jacob, An Economic Rationale for
the Legal Treatment of Omissions in Tort Law: The Principle of Salience, 3
THEORETICAL JNQ. L. 413 (2002).
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
165 See, e.g., Harel & Jacob, supra note 163; Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs
and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991); Harold
J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 114 (1916); Victor
E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: the Need for a
Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38 (1983);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges As Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999).
166 See, e.g., Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444
(1923); Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: the
Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. L. REV. 573 (2005).
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improves the injured party's chance to receive compensation for
the damage she has suffered. 167 Being the deep pocket is not by
itself justification enough for there may be many deep pockets.
However, the legal system is willing to impose liability on the
employer because he is the primary beneficiary of the employee's
acts. 
68
Finally, there are those who suggest that one of the major
purposes of this expansion of liability was to overcome the "not
me, try someone else" phenomenon.' 69 Making the employer liable
lightens the injured party's burden of proof, because she does not
have to establish the identity of the particular person who hit her.
She can throw the blame on the employer who will then have no
incentive to conceal the identity of the real injurer.
1 70
These justifications not only provide the rationales for the
imposition of liability on employers but also identify the outer
boundaries of the liability envelope. Even though some courts have
tried to push the boundaries, in general the borders are clearly
delineated. Thus, when the employee is not under her employer's
control, for example and the employer cannot observe her
activities, the employer's ability to minimize the loss is reduced
relative to the employee's ability to prevent damage, which makes
it less appealing to hold the employer liable. Moreover, when the
employee is engaged in activities that are not related to the
employer's business, it also makes less sense to impose liability on
the latter. Not only has the employer less control in such cases, but
imposing liability on him is unjust since he no longer benefits from
the employee's acts.
B. The Restatement of Agency in the Context of
Copyright Law
The question is how the rationales and justifications
mentioned above are related to copyright law. It is easy to see the
link between the imposition of tortious liability, its boundaries and
justifications, and the Restatement's guidelines. These
167 This is true with one caveat the "dilution of liability" phenomenon. In
alternative care cases the more tortfeasors there are liable, the lesser the
incentive of each to take precautions. See Harel & Jacob, supra note 163.
168 It should be noted that imposing liability on the employer does not release the
employee from liability for her tortious acts. Both the employer and the
employee will be jointly and severally liable. Saying that, however, does not
change the fact that the injured party will mainly pursue the employer, and not
the employee, for the employer has a deeper pocket.
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justifications for liability, as the Restatement's title suggests, are
from the realm of torts and promote the goals which the tort system
strives to achieve. Can these same tests, shaped over the years to
perfectly fit the tort system, 71 promote the goals of copyright law?
The answer to that must be in the negative. I believe that
some of the crucial justifications for the imposition of tort liability
upon employers, and, as a derivative, the definition of the status of
an employee, do not hold when we transform them to the realm of
copyright law. To prove my contention I will highlight some of the
major differences between the fields - differences that would
suggest the need for different tests to decide the status of the hired
person and the course of her employment.
One crucial difference is that tort law deals with assigning
liability whereas copyright law deals with assigning rights. As
discussed above, extending tortious liability to the employer and
making him liable for the acts of his employee improves the
positions of both the employee and the injured party. This justifies
a rather extensive definition of "employee" and the "scope of the
employment. ' 72 In copyright law, however, defining someone as
an employee serves to assign to the employer a right to receive a
benefit. Thus, finding the status of the hired person to be that of an
employee worsens her position in comparison to finding her an
independent contractor.1 73 As regards third parties, in tort law,
third parties can only improve their position by adding another
tortfeasor because this increases their chances to receive full
compensation.1 74 In the area of copyright, the situation is muddier.
In order to answer the question of the effects on third parties, we
have to consider issues such as incentives to create, access of third
parties to the works, and other elements which I will address later
in this article. 75 At this point, I find it enough to say that ruling for
the employer will not necessarily improve third parties' rights.
171 Some courts are even skeptical about that. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944).
172 There are judges and tort scholars who believe that these terms should be
furthered extended. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir.
1995) (Calabresi, J.).
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 7, topic 2, tit. B, introductory
note (1958) ("The whole purpose of employing the term [independent
contractors] is to negate the special consequences of the master-servant relation,
that is, the liability for torts within the scope of employment, and the special
duties and immunities of the master to servants.").
174 Based on the rule of joint and several liability in which each defendant is
liable for the entire harm both individually and collectively. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 169, § 9.2.
175 See infra Part VB.
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Another important distinction between tort law and
copyright law regards the issue of justice. In tortious liability the
situation is clear - it is unjust that the employer benefits from the
employee's work and does not have to pay for the employee's
mistakes. In copyright law, however, finding the hired person to be
an employee only benefits the employer without imposing any
correlating duties upon him.' 76  The other two justifications,
spreading the loss and minimizing damages, are not relevant to
copyright law either.
And what about the issue of control, which is a repeated
element in the Restatement? Although the issue of control is very
important to both copyright and tort law, the types of control which
are important differ in each context. The Restatement and CCNV
emphasize control involved in determining whether the hiring or
hired party is in a better position to prevent damage or to minimize
loss. 177 This is not necessarily the type of control important for
copyright purposes. Under copyright law, one of the prevailing
factors should be artistic control because artistic control indicates
the relative creative input of each party.1 78 But, the list of
parameters enumerated in the Restatement barely includes artistic
control. This is true, especially, in the modern world, where
technology has taken a giant leap in influencing the patterns of
employment.
C. Using the Same Test in Different Areas of Law
Using a uniform test for deciding the status of the hired
person yields an erroneous outcome. It does not allow the court to
176 One can make the argument that it is only reasonable for the employer to
receive the benefit because he is paying the employee's salary. In other words,
that is the risk allocation the parties have chosen. This, however, is a different
argument that will be discussed later on.
177 This can be deduced from the description of the type of control needed as
explained in the introductory note to topic 2 of chapter 7. "Because the servant
is an internal element of the establishment, it is normal for the head of the
enterprise to control his physical acts and also the time when he is to act for the
enterprise. Primarily, the servant sells his personal services, submitting to
control as to his physical activities and the use of his time." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).
178 There are court decisions that suggest that even the artistic control factor is
not decisive. See, e.g., Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha
Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 640-41 (2d Cir. 2004)
("There is no need for the employer to be the precipitating force behind each
work created by a salaried employee, acting within the scope of her regular
employment. Many talented people, whether creative artists or leaders of major
corporations, are expected by their employers to produce the sort of work for
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fine tune the test to fit different areas of law and ignores the goals
each area is designated to achieve and the values it tends to
promote. Consider the following scenario: I ask someone to build a
statue on my property. She has the artistic control over the work
and decides how much and when to work. I, on the other hand, am
responsible for the safety of the project (I have the right to
supervise her work in terms of safety norms, such as the use of
fences, helmets, etc.) During the course of the work a piece of the
statue falls on the head of a visitor to my property. He demands
compensation. At the same time I want to make a derivative work
of the statue and the artist refuses. I want the court to declare I am
the owner of the copyrights in the statue. Is there a justification to
decide both issues together, based on the same test? Some judges
seem to think so, finding that a good outcome would result and that
the same test would promote justice among the involved parties.'
1 79
With all due respect, I disagree. I think the different rationales
behind each area of law deserve different approaches. Some of the
deciding factors may coexist but only if a thorough examination of
the subject matter suggests that they should be taken into account,
not just for the sake of simplifying matters or as a mere
coincidence.
Adopting the Agency test creates the problem of "multi-
feedbacks." By "multi-feedbacks," I mean effects which are the
byproducts of applying same or similar definitions to different
areas of law. Since the agency test is prevalent in many areas,110 its
interpretation in any of those areas of law influences its
interpretation within copyright law and vice versa.1 81 The problem
is that the implementation of the agency test in different areas of
law might, and usually does, result in different outcomes in terms
of promoting the interests of the involved parties and the inherent
goals we strive to achieve. As I mentioned above, an interpretation
179 See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterps., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A]dopting an agency law
definition of copyright 'employment' creates a certain moral symmetry: a buyer
is a statutory 'author' if and only if he is responsible for the negligent acts of the
seller. For example, a buyer will only be the 'author' of a writing if he would be
liable under respondeat superior in a defamation action based on that writing.").
180 For instance, torts, labor law, copyright law, social security, tax law, etc.
181 Some courts are aware of the problem and have tried to minimize it by
"changing" the test. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, 237
F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[The] Aymes [decision] does indeed
emphasize the presumptive significance of five of the Reid factors, including
those related to benefits and tax treatment. However, we have never applied this
weighing of the Reid factors outside of the copyright context, and we decline to
do so here because of an important difference between the work-for-hire
doctrine and anti-discrimination law.").
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that would promote the interests of an employee in one area of law
might be very much against her interests in a different area. For
example, a determination using the same agency law test that an
individual is a private contractor, not an employee, might entitle
her with the right to copyrights, but simultaneously expose her to
tort liability.
"Multi-feedbacks" related to the agency test not only arise
across different areas of law, but they also arise within one area of
law, though to a lesser extent. In copyright law, for example,
multi-feedback occurs in disputes with third parties. Consider a
case in which either the employer or employee brings a claim of
infringement against a third party. The third party defends himself
by arguing that the suing party is not the legal author and does not
own the rights in the work. In such a case the court must balance
between the third party's rights and the rights of the
employer/employee. The tendency of the courts in such cases is
often to protect the work, deeming whoever is the plaintiff in the
suit to be the legal author.1 82 This decision, however, may later
affect the respective rights of the parties in the same or other cases
when the employer or the employee are suing each other for
copyright ownership.
Some courts were aware of this problem before CCNV and
wanted to avoid this unified test. A good example can be found in
Dumas, where the court stated:
182 See, for example, how the court applies the CCNV factors in Langman
Fabrics v. GraffCaliforniawear, 160 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998). Also notice the
way the court in Easter Seal Society analyzed the Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel,
Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), decision with regard to its interpretation of the
work made for hire doctrine:
The "work for hire" issue in Aldon Accessories arose as a
defensive tactic adopted by a third-party infringer to dispute
the validity of the plaintiff's copyright. This posture makes the
"literal" reading of the 1976 Act particularly unattractive,
because it is the infringer and not the independent contractor
who will benefit from a ruling that the work was not made
"for hire." In other words, the Aldon Accessories court may
have been driven to create the narrow "actual control"
exception to the general rule that independent contractors hold
the copyright under the 1976 Act by the fact that on appeal the
defendant more or less conceded infringement but tried to
escape liability on "work for hire" grounds. What the court
did not appear to bear in mind is that any buyer satisfying a
seriously enforced "actual control" test will ordinarily be a co-
author of the work, entitled to bring and win an action for
infringement against a third party.
815 F.2d at 333.
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[T]he Restatement of Agency [does not] provide a
"good fit" in the copyright context. While broad,
generalized definitions of terms such as "employee"
may be desirable in common law situations or
statutory schemes applying to a wide variety of
situations, often unforeseeable, it must be
remembered that the Copyright Act applies to a
relatively narrow class of persons and situations.
The drafters recognized this and intended the
definition to be tailored to the realities of the
copyright marketplace. Agency law principles,
because they apply so broadly, do not provide the
clarity required by the Act. 183
Other courts not only observed the difference between
various areas of law but went even further, saying that the unified
concept of the agency test is only an illusion. One such decision
was given by the Supreme Court itself, which said:
The argument assumes that there is some simple,
uniform and easily applicable test which the courts
have used, in dealing with such problems, to
determine whether persons doing work for others
fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is
not true. Only by a long and tortuous history was
the simple formulation worked out which has been
stated most frequently as "the test" for deciding
whether one who hires another is responsible in tort
for his wrongdoing. But this formula has been by
no means exclusively controlling in the solution of
other problems. And its simplicity has been illusory
because it is more largely simplicity of formulation
than of application. Few problems in the law have
given greater variety of application and conflict in
results than the cases arising in the borderland
between what is clearly an employer-employee
relationship and what is clearly one of independent,
entrepreneurial dealing. This is true within the
limited field of determining vicarious liability in
tort. It becomes more so when the field is expanded
to include all of the possible applications of the
distinction. 1
84
183 865 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
184 NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944). Hearst is only
one example out of many in which the Supreme Court and other courts have
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The court in this case was referring to the implementation of the
test with regard to the status of the hired person in the context of
the National Labor Relations Act, but the argument has equal
strength in the context of copyright law.
It is true that some of the above mentioned decisions were
overruled by Congress by way of changing the definitions in the
statutes. 185 This, however, is not necessarily a bad outcome.1 86 If
the legislature changes the law it is compelled to think about the
various interests involved in the particular area of the law it is
dealing with, so the final definition might better reflect the inner
balance of a given area of law. 187 The amendments, if made, might
also make the law clearer and easier to apply.
The court's interpretation of a hired party's status ex post is
only one aspect of the problem. The agency test also causes
problems in earlier stages. Knowing the legal rule ex ante, the
parties are confronted with a binary choice (at least as a default
rule) in deciding on the hired party's status: either to deem the
expressly made their opinion that different tests should be used. See, e.g., United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947). Hearst deals with the Social Security Act,
and the Silk Court, dealing with the status of the hired person, said:
As the federal social security legislation is an attack on
recognized evils in our national economy, a constricted
interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport
with its purpose .... The word "employee," we said, was not
there used as a word of art, and its content in its context was a
federal problem to be construed "in the light of the mischief to
be corrected and the end to be attained."
331 U.S. at 712-13.
185 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Hearst,
322 U.S. 704(1944). As the Court explains in A[LRB v. United Insurance Co.,
after the Hearst decision, Congress had passed an amendment specifically
excluding individuals with the status of independent contractors from the
definition of employee contained in the National Labor Relations Act. "The
obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts apply
general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors under the Act." 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
186 Some of the cases that were overruled put heavy pressure on the legislature to
amend the vague definitions of the laws or to come up with definitions when the
laws lacked any. As a consequence, some of the amendments, especially in the
area of labor law, extended the breadth of the statute to include more workers as
employees, which in the labor law context seems like a good outcome.
187 Strong interest groups can put a great pressure on the Legislature to change
the laws in their favor and therefore distort the "right" outcome. Some view the
DMCA as a good example. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming
Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT LJ 567 (2006); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The
Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, And The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 897-98 (2001).
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hired party an employee or an independent contractor. Each side
will assess the benefits of the portfolio and then decide what the
best outcome is. From the involved parties perspective that might
not be an optimal result because they may have been better off if
they decided the status according to their different interests in the
different fields of law. And indeed, in many areas of law the
parties can change the outcome of the default rule by contracting
around it.188 This leads us to the next question: Does the "work
made for hire" test really matter if the parties can contract around
it?
D. Why the Test Matters - the Option of Contracting
Around
Section 201(b), which entitles the employer with the
copyright in cases of a work made for hire, explicitly enables the
parties to contract around it by deciding in writing who will be the
right's owner. Thus, one can argue that this mechanism downplays
the role of the work made for hire rule and its outcomes.
According to this argument, the initial assignment of rights to the
parties is relatively unimportant because the parties can contract
around the assigned rights. The parties can change the initial
entitlement as they wish and adapt the contractual price to reflect
expected gains and outcomes. 189 Moreover, one could argue that,
given the option of private ordering, the court might feel less
obligated to provide consistent interpretation of the work made for
hire rule because cautious parties can set their own arrangement. If
the parties choose not to do so it is their fault. And, indeed, the
District Court opinion in CCNV stated:
Reid could have bargained with CCNV for the
copyright but did not do so. Consequently he will
have to content himself with the considerable
acclaim the statue has and will receive, and the
public's recognition of him as the talented artist
who executed it. But in the absence of a writing to
the contrary, the law leaves no doubt that 'Third
World America' is a work made for hire, and
188 One can think of areas such as contract law, family law and corporate law
etc. However, one can also find examples in the law of torts, labor law, etc.
189 This may be why the Supreme Court in CCNV endorsed the argument that
Congress's paramount goal in revising the Copyright Act was to enhance
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. 490 U.S. 730, 749-50
(1989).
39
Jacob: TORT MADE FOR HIRE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 96 (2009)
CCNV the exclusive owner of the copyright
therein.
190
As we all know, this outcome was overruled by the Supreme
Court.
The above mentioned arguments about the initial
assignment of rights are part of a bigger debate on the importance
of default rules. In the last decade many scholars have resented this
belittling approach, arguing that the default rules make a big
difference and that therefore legislators should pay close attention
on how to set them. 191 Elaboration on this issue is beyond the
scope of this article. However, I do want to highlight some of the
relevant points in the context of copyright law:
First, this notion, that the parties can contract around and
adjust the contractual price, is based on the assumption of
predictable outcomes. The less predictable the outcome, the more
difficulties the parties will have in adjusting their contract.
92
Given the work made for hire test and its interpretation by the
court, the specific outcome in many cases is very hard to predict
and, therefore, the parties have a hard time in negotiating the final
resolution of rights.
Second, indeed, in a world without transaction costs the
parties can achieve the best outcome by private ordering. However,
in the real world, oftentimes the parties will not be able to contract
around the default rule for several reasons, among which are the
costs of contracting. The costs of contracting might be any cost
that the parties incur in the process of making a contract that
differs from the default rules. This includes not only the more
quantifiable costs such as drafting the contract, legal fees, printing
fees, but also the less quantifiable costs of learning about the
190 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1457 (D.D.C.
1987).
191 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989); Omri Ben-
Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 651, 669 (2006); Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis,
3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71-72 (1993); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of
Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
192 Each one of the parties will not be able to asses the outcome. This would add
uncertainty, which in turn adds to the transaction costs of contracting around
default rules. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 103-09 (2004).
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possibilities and about the benefits of changing the default rules.
The higher these costs, the less likely that the parties will bother to
contract around the default rules. 193 Thus, for example, a new
employee might not be aware that she has the option to contract
around the default rule of ownership or not accurately assess the
real benefits from such a contract and therefore avoid this option
altogether.1 94 The more the transaction costs involved, the more
likely the parties will stick with a default that does not reflect their
best choice. 195 Moreover, even if the parties actually pursue their
right to contract around the default rule, the costs of doing so are a
social waste, which society would like to minimize.
Other scholars emphasize other reasons why parties are not
able to overcome default rules. One can broadly characterize these
reasons as different types of transaction costs that prevent the
parties from achieving the best assignment of rights. For example,
Korobkin emphasizes the importance of the default assignment of
rights through the application of the "endowment effect."'1 96 He
concludes that the reluctance of people to give up physical items
that they receive is similar to the reluctance of people to forgo
default rules that endow them with rights.1 97 In legal rules as in
chattels people are cognitively disposed to prefer default rules
irrespective of their content. Therefore, the default assignment of
rights might hold ex post even if the parties, ex ante, would opt for
a different contract. Lisa Bernstein, on the other hand, explains
the importance of the default rules through the social costs of
deviation. 199 Altering the default rule might involve social costs of
deviation from the prevalent norm. These costs can vary in
different scenarios (e.g. different industries, repeated versus non-
repeated games) but they are likely to impose a heavy weight on
193 Id.
194 In this example the lack of information, mainly on the employee's part,
translates to high transaction costs. Many employees are not fully aware of their
options, and even those who are aware of the legal consequences of their
contract may still have difficulties assessing the real value of contracting around
the default rule.
195 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 191. By "best choice," I mean what the parties
would have contracted for had they have the chance to plan the transaction
without constraints.
196 Korobkin, supra note 191. See also Kahneman, supra note 191; Thaler,
supra note 191, at 44.
197 See Korobkin, supra note 191, at 1626-27.
198 Id.
199 Bernstein, supra note 191, at 71-72.
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the parties not to change the defaults.200 The higher the social
costs, the lower the incentive to deviate from the default rule.
Thus, an employee who wants to change the default rule has to
rationalize the different contract she insists on. By doing so, the
employee might give the wrong impression about herself and her
character and therefore might forgo this option altogether.20 1 For
example, an employee might be willing to accept a lower salary in
exchange for copyrights in her works. The employer might also
prefer such a compromise. But, due to the social costs and the
signaling effect of drafting a different term, the employee will be
deterred from communicating her will and therefore the
assignment of rights will not be optimal.20 2
Ben-Shahar provides yet another explanation for the
stickiness of the default rules.20 3 He bases his explanation on the
fear of the unknown. Ben-Shahar proposes that if, as he believes,
the default rules are stickier than previous analysis suggests, then
policymakers should place more emphasis on setting accurate
defaults because the departure costs might be higher than
previously thought. 204
And indeed, if this is the case in the consideration of work
made for hire, legislators and courts should pay close attention to
the initial assignment of rights.20 5 The default rule should mimic
the will of the majority of the involved parties so that, in most
situations, the parties do not have to settle for inferior agreements
dictated by the default rule. Then, only a limited number of parties
would have to incur the costs of creating an alternative agreement
to the default rule.
However, things might turn out to be more complicated.
For example, a different paradigm for explaining the importance of
the default rule is the theory of "penalty defaults." The idea behind
this paradigm is that the default rule serves as an information
harnessing mechanism. Under this theory, the penalty default
mechanism gives at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule.20 6 The advocates of the Penalty




203 Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 191, at 669.
204 Id.
205 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
206 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 191.
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the default is often desirable.2 °7 By contracting around the default
rule, the parties have to reveal information to the less informed
party or to third parties.20 8 Thus, the Penalty Default rule paradigm
entitles the less informed party with the right, so that, in order to
avoid the inferior contract, the counter party will have to reveal
information about the transaction. This paradigm, like the
paradigms previously mentioned, emphasizes the role of courts and
legislators in the initial assignment of rights but does so for a
different reason. Under the Penalty Default theory, the assignment
of rights should not mimic the will of the majority of the involved
parties but should lead to the revelation of hidden information.
Applying this rationale in the context of copyright law will lead to
a narrower interpretation of the term "employee" and "scope of the
employment." Vesting the right, by default, with the less informed
party, usually the agent, will lead the employer to try to contract
around the default rule, and as a consequence, to provide the
employee with more information.
Third, the default rules are not only relevant in terms of
incentives but also in terms of distribution of wealth. If one of the
parties gets the right and the other buys the right from her it is true
that the copyright final entitlement ends up in the hands of the
party who values it most. The party, however, who gets the initial
entitlement is in a better position because she gets remunerated for
selling her rights.
Fourth, up to this point, the analysis of the "work made for
hire" test assumed that the parties can set their own agreement.
This assumption, however, does not follow from the language of
the Copyright Act. According to § 201, the parties can only decide
who will be the copyright's owner. They cannot change the actual
status of the work. As the court mentioned in CCNV,20 9 classifying
a work as 'made for hire' determines not only the issue of initial
ownership, but also other issues such as the copyright duration, the
owner's renewal rights, termination rights,210 and the right to
import certain goods bearing the copyright.
2
17 Id. at91.
208 Id. at 97.
209 CCNV, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (citing I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(A), at 5-10 (1988)).
210 "Designating a work as 'made for hire' irretrievably takes away more than
just the artist's copyright; it also deprives him or her of the opportunity to
renegotiate the transfer after the market value of the work has been more
precisely determined." Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
1989).
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The question then arises: why limit the parties' power to
shape the general status of the work? The common justification
for such limitation is either paternalistic or in the interest of third
parties. The paternalistic justification rationalizes the limitation by
protecting one of the parties to the contract - the party least able to
protect her interests. On its face, it seems that the paternalistic
justification is highly relevant to the context of employer-
employee. The employer can take advantage of the employee, who
is less knowledgeable and powerful than the employer and
therefore, arguably, the employee should be protected. However,
further inquiry demonstrates that this justification is not decisive in
the context of works made for hire. First, the most important
economic aspect - rights ownership - does not fall under the legal
limitation. The parties can resolve the issue of who gets ownership
as they wish, so long as they comply with the formal
211requirements. Second, if the work is considered to be a work
made for hire, the default rule favors the employer 212 - the strong
party. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the employer gets the
rights. Third, in this context the employee is not necessarily
weaker than the employer. It is true that when a new employee is
hired, she will often be in an inferior position to the employer.
However, the employee can renegotiate her rights later down the
road before she creates a new work, asking to get ownership in it.
If not, she might reserve the right not to create it. This
renegotiation will take place when the employee is already
employed, and when the employee has more information about her
status and the benefits she can derive from the work. Thus, it
seems that concern for the parties themselves - the employer and
the creator of the work - is not an adequate reason to limit their
power to control the status of the work.
The main concern, therefore, shifts to the interest of third
parties. As discussed, the test the court uses to define whether the
work is made for hire is adopted from the area of tort law. In this
area both legislators and courts are highly concerned with the
rights and interests of injured third parties. The law does not allow
(strict and cogent terms under tort law) would-be injurers to assign
211 It seems that some courts are aware of this issue in the context of copyrights.
However, these courts emphasize the right to renegotiation under the
termination of rights proviso as a benefit for the author, provided by law. As the
court in Dumas articulated, "[i]t can fairly be assumed that the buyer will
virtually always be able to contract for ownership of the copyright; what the
statute essentially protects is the artist's right to renegotiate the transfer at a later
date under § 203(a)." Id. at 1101.
212 A counter argument would maintain that the test adopted by the court for the
definition of work made for hire decides the status of the work. If it is not a
work made for hire, the default rule favors the employee.
2008-2009
44
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 11 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol11/iss1/3
TORT MADE FOR HIRE - RECONSIDERING THE CCNV
CASE
liability among themselves because chances are that such an
assignment would work for the detriment of the third party. Thus,
if one of the parties is the "shallow pocket" - say he is about to go
bankrupt - the parties will have a strong incentive to contractually
assign him the liability, because he will not be able to pay anyway.
In copyright law the risk of derogation of the rights of third
parties is not as high as in torts, but the legislator still takes it into
account due to the Constitution's mandate.213 Thus, works made
for hire have a different copyright duration, a different owner's
renewal rights, different termination rights, etc. The outcome
therefore is that the parties themselves can contract around the
default rule with regard to the issue of ownership but they cannot
change the status of the work as 'made for hire' because of its
effect on third parties.
Given all of the above, it is clear that the test matters. If
this is the case, it is better to reshape the default rule so that it
reflects the interests of the involved parties and third parties, based
on the goals of copyright law.214 This leads us to the next question:
what kind of test should the court apply?
IV. IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHT TEST
A. Shaping the Test to Reflect the Basic Elements of
Copyright Law
The guiding principle for copyright law is "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing ... to Authors
... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings. 21 5 These are
the instructions to both legislatures and courts on how to enact and
interpret copyright protection.1 6 And indeed, the overwhelming
precedent in copyright law reflects this underlying theme in courts'
217decisions. For example, when courts decide who the author of a
213 See discussion infra Part V.
214 This does not mean that the employee should get all the rights to her work all
of the time or even most of the time. It only suggests that in order to best
allocate rights, courts should take into account the relevant factors from the
relevant field of law.
215 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
216 See, e.g., Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ("[T]he Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations
upon the exercise of that power." (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
217 For example, in Baker v. Selden, the Court noted that to extend copyright
protection to ideas, which were not meant to be protected by copyright law, is to
commit a "fraud upon the public." 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880). Similar arguments
were made in Feist, where the Court again stated that "[t]he primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of
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joint work is, they emphasize elements from within the realm of
copyright law such as artistic control and contribution of
copyrightable material.218
It seems that in the U.S. legal system almost everyone
agrees that Clause 8 authorizes the granting of a temporary
monopoly in original works in order to motivate authors and
inventors to create while ensuring the public's free access to the
work when the monopoly expires.2 19 The economic justification
behind the clause is that encouraging the author's and inventor's
individual effort by ensuring personal gain provides the best way
to advance public welfare through the accumulation of "Science
and useful Arts., 220 Even Eldred v. Ashcrof,221 a decision highly
criticized for legitimizing Congress's extension of the copyright
protection term, uses the incentive scheme as part of its underlying
rationale. The majority in that case took the view that extending
copyright protection provides a greater incentive for American and
other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United
222States. To support the opinion, the Supreme Court also cited
testimony made to Congress that the extension could provide
additional income which would finance the production and
Science and useful Arts."' Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). To this end, copyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by their work. Based on
this justification, the court rejected the application of the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine in providing copyright protection, arguing that protecting only the fruits
of labor distorts basic copyright principles. Copyright defenses against
infringement employ a similar analysis. Here again, the courts use incentives
analysis to decide how to balance the rights of the authors, weighing the
encouragement of creation against the right of the public to access the created
works.
218 See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It seems
more consistent with the spirit of copyright law to oblige all joint authors to
make copyrightable contributions, leaving those with non-copyrightable
contributions to protect their rights through contract."); BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43
F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. La. 1999).
219 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
220 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) ("Congress'
adjustment of the author/publisher balance is a permissible expression of the
economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause], i.e., the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort [motivated] by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
221 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
222 Id. at 206.
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distribution of new works.2 2 3 The public benefits not only from an
author's original work but also from the authors' further
224creations. In this respect the minority agreed:
[W]e should take the following as well established:
that copyright statutes must serve public, not
private, ends; that they must seek "to promote the
Progress" of knowledge and learning; and that they
must do so both by creating incentives for authors
to produce and by removing the related restrictions
on dissemination after expiration of a copyright's
"limited Time."
225
The work made for hire doctrine uses a test derived from an
unrelated area of law and fails to even attempt to use that test to
accommodate copyright consideration.226  If the goal is to
maximize the creation of useful arts, how did courts end up with
this "work made for hire" doctrine?227 It seems that part of the
223 One can argue that the Eldred majority only paid lip service to the economic
rationale, but, at the least, the Justices felt compelled to rationalize their decision
using economic tools.
224 The majority referred to the example of Noah Webster, who supported his
entire family from the earnings on his speller and grammar during the twenty
years he took to complete his dictionary. Id. at 199.
225 Id. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The minority opinion
emphasizes this issue again later:
The Clause assumes an initial grant of monopoly, designed
primarily to encourage creation, followed by termination of
the monopoly grant in order to promote dissemination of
already-created works. It assumes that it is the disappearance
of the monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will, on
balance, promote the dissemination of works already in
existence.
Id.
226 It is possible that the "work made for hire" doctrine, taken from agency law,
could bring about an outcome similar to a test based on copyright
considerations. But even if these parameters reflect both tortious and copyright
interests, one has to implement them according to the goals each law must
achieve. The court's practice is to implement these factors without taking those
into consideration (or at least not specifically) and therefore does not reflect (or
only coincidentally reflects) the goals copyright law strives to achieve.
227 This is even more puzzling given the fact that courts are aware of the inherent
ambiguity in the work made for hire doctrine as stated in the law. See, e.g.,
Easter Seal Soc.'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1987) ("'Employee,' for example, can mean either a
formal employee, i.e., a person on a payroll designated an 'employee' by the
parties to the hiring contract, it can mean an agency-law 'employee,' i.e., a
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answer is that the U.S. Supreme Court took this path after
Congress overruled some of its context-based "employee" and
"scope of the employment" decisions.228 This, however, does not
mean that context-based interpretation will be overruled with
regard to copyright law in the future. Given that the Supreme
Court's goal of achieving uniformity by using a "one size fits all
test" has not been achieved, 229 1 believe that a more context-based
application of the "work made for hire" doctrine is warranted.
There are several ways to bring the "work made for hire
doctrine" back on track. The best solution would be to re-shape the
doctrine in the Copyright Act itself, without any of today's black
letter legal restrictions, based on the relevant incentives scheme of
copyright law. Such a revision would not rely on the employee-
contractor dichotomy at all, and instead ask who is the one best to
incentivize. However, given the fact that only the legislature can
amend the statute, it will likely be left to the courts to provide a
second best solution, reshaping the "work made for hire" doctrine,
within its legal confines, so that it would better fit the objectives of
copyright law.The way to do this is to re-define the status of
"employee" and the term "scope of the employment" based on the
copyright incentives scheme. Here, again, two lines of
interpretation are available - the first, and the more dramatic one,
is to depart from the agency test altogether, shaping a context
sensitive definition of these terms. The courts could interpret the
terms employee and scope of the employment outside of the
agency time-honored restrictions, instead interpreting "employee"
'servant' subject to the employer's right to control the manner of performance,
or a copyright 'employee,' i.e., a seller of services (whether a formal or agency
employee or not) who loses his claim of authorship under 'work for hire'
analysis. 'Employer' and 'independent contractor' are ambiguous in correlative
ways.").
228 See supra note 185.
229 See, e.g., Alexandra Duran, Comment, Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid: the Supreme Court Reduces Predictability by Attributing an
Agency Standard to the Work for Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1083-84 (1990) ("[T]he Court's reliance on the
general common law of agency created a baffling and complex factfinding
problem for those lay individuals who must predict their employment status to
survive professionally. Agency law, with its myriad factors, is more complex to
apply than the standards the Court put aside and its application will result in
greater uncertainty and inevitable litigation."); Jon L. Roberts, Work Made for
Hire: the Fiction, the Reality and the Impact upon Software Development, 1
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 122 (1988) ("The[] diverse standards create uncertainty
for both the commissioning party, which expects to own the copyright in the
work, and for the software developer, who does not expect to surrender these
rights."); Spadt, supra note 92, at 202 (1997) ("There is ... uncertainty in
applying agency law principles to the facts of individual cases.").
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and "scope of the employment" in a manner that achieves
copyright goals.230 If society wants to incentivize the hired person
(and assuming no access problems) it would treat her as an
independent contractor and if society wants to incentivize the
hiring party, it will treat the hired party as an employee. In this
manner, courts could decide the matter on its merits, based on a
unique interpretation of the terms "employee" and "scope of the
employment" developed especially for copyright law. In doing so,
courts wouldn't have to borrow factors from other areas of law and
explain why they fit the realm of copyright law. Some such factors
clearly do not fit, while others do. But without these restraints and
with a tailor made interpretation, courts can reach better decisions.
Given the CCNV decision, however, such a route may be
too radical for courts to take. A second option is to continue to use
the parameters of the agency test, but to saturate them with as
many elements as possible from the common copyright dialogue.
This would not only change the weight of the elements 231 and
make some of them more important than others, but also provide
courts with guidelines on how to rule in cases such as those
discussed above.
B. Parameters Courts Should Consider When Deciding
Whether a Given Work is a Work Made for Hire
No matter which of the above paths the courts, or
legislature, would choose to take to bring the "work made for hire"
doctrine back on track, the doctrine should be reshaped with the
same criteria in mind- criteria based on the motivations of
copyright law. I suggest the following as factors to be considered
in any new test for the "work made for hire" doctrine.
1. Incentives
The courts' first concern should be how the assignment of
rights will affect future parties' incentives to create new works.232
230 Of course, such a drastic reinterpretation of the term "employee" would need
to be sanctioned by the Supreme Court, in a reversal of CCNV. However, since
the Court did not officially declare that the agency definition of "scope of
employment" was the proper definition to apply, courts could choose to define
this term more liberally, with the motivations of copyright law in mind.
231 By adding more factors, courts can dilute the weight of each individual
factor.
232 This approach is not foreign to the courts. In Martha Graham Sch. & Dance
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., the court was
willing to accept this idea, but reserved its adoption for Congress. As Judge
Newman stated:
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In the employment context, the answer to that might not be simple,
but focusing on this issue will help the courts to reach the right
outcome, providing a background against which the judgment will
be made. This question should be asked from an ex-ante
perspective: entitling whom with what rights will maximize
creativity and enhance the creation of future works? The answer to
this question is both fact sensitive and industry sensitive. To decide
it, courts should also consider whether the involved parties have
other incentives to create new works and the extent to which the
added incentives resulting from the entitlement make them more
productive.233
In academia, for example, the question is whether copyright
in an article written by a professor belongs to her or to the
University. It seems that according to the black letter law and its
interpretation by the CCNV court, professors are employees and
the work is made within the scope of their employment. Therefore,
without a written contract to the contrary, the university is entitled
to the rights. However, as I mentioned above, this issue is highly
debatable and many believe that an academic article, written by an
academic professor, is entitled to an exception from the general
rule. The argument for the professors is that giving the university
the rights negatively affects the productivity of professors.234 If this
is indeed the case, there is a real reason for the exception.
The argument of the Appellants and the Amici is not without
some appeal, at least as a matter of creative arts policy. We
understand their point that where a corporation is formed for
the purpose of fostering a supportive environment in which an
employed artist will have the opportunity to create new works,
the default rule should leave the copyrights in the new works
with the employee, and place on the employer the burden of
pursuing a contract to obtain her copyrights.
380 F.3d 624, 640 (2d Cir. 2004).
233 If the employee has other incentives, then ruling against her will not
significantly affect her incentives scheme. This does not mean that courts should
not assign her the right, but only that this element will be considered against her.
The final decision should, of course, be based on other relevant factors as well.
234 See, e.g., Todd A. Borow, Copyright Ownership of Scholarly Works Created
by University Faculty and Posted on School-Provided Web Pages, 7 U. MIAMI
Bus. L. REV. 149, 150 (1998) ("In the case of a university professor, copyright
protection offers the professor an incentive to produce new scholarly works.
Society then gains from the introduction of the new works."); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 590, 612 (1987) ("If universities assert their statutory right to copyright
only in certain circumstances, faculty members will be likely to choose not to
work on the type of projects in which their universities are likely to claim an
interest, regardless of whether those projects are the ones that optimize the use
of their talents."); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright Issues in Online
Courses: Ownership, Authorship and Conflict, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
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My argument is, however, that in such a case there should
be no need for an exception because we should always decide
work made for hire based, among other things, on incentives to
create. The question then should be which initial entitlement will
maximize the incentives to create new works. Indeed, one can
argue that professors do not need extra incentives to write articles
because they have other incentives. According to this argument,
the slogan "publish or perish" has real bite in academia because
professors who don't publish don't make tenure. However, once
the professors make tenure their incentive to write weakens, and
then, economic or other incentives to write books or articles might
motivate them to create more new works. Therefore, incentive-
wise there is a stronger justification for entitling professors with
the initial right after they make tenure. 235
In this context the government example of copyrighted
works is also interesting. The U.S. government is not entitled to
copyright ownership upon creation. Instead, the U.S. government
can only get copyright by assignment.236 Therefore, if someone
considered to be a U.S. government employee creates a work
within the scope of her employment, neither the employee nor the
employer directly benefits from the work because the work has no
copyright protection. On the other hand, if the work is found not to
be made for hire, the agent has a bigger incentive to create due to
the fact that she has copyright in the work.237 She can later assign
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20-21 (2001) ("The incentive-based rationale underlying
copyright protection has, in fact, driven at least one university to pay royalties to
professors whose on-line materials are used by other instructors, as well as a
percentage of the tuition generated by the courses."); James B. Wadley &
JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights,
Work-For-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J.
385, 439-40 (1999).
235 An interesting argument can be made with regard to the type of the produced
works and their quality. Entitling the university with copyrights might change
the types of works that would be produced and might lower their quality. As for
the types of works, professors, knowing that the university will have ownership
in some works, may divert their time and efforts to other projects in which they
internalize more benefits. As for the quality of the works, external economic
pressure by the university might affect the prerogative of the author not to begin
a work or let idea gestate for a couple of years at the conceptualization phase.
"These fallow periods may serve as opportunities to store experiences and to
engage in a form of undirected research, and thus may lead to more creative
work than would have developed had the creator been forced to produce on an
externally imposed, accelerated schedule." Dreyfuss, supra note 234, at 613.
236 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2008).
237 This might explain the court decision in Roeslin, in which the hiring party
was the government.
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the right to the government and get remunerated for it.
238
Therefore, at least with regard to the incentives scheme, the
application of the work made for hire factors can be more lax. The
hired person gains incentives, while the government does not lose
incentives.239
The status of a "work made for hire" also has implications
on issues of moral rights, since a work made for hire is not entitled
to moral rights under Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA").240 If a
work is considered to be a work made for hire, then, under
copyright law there is no right of attribution. 241 There is also no
right to prevent modification of a work which would be prejudicial
to author's honor or reputation. This might reduce the artistic
incentives to create such a work to begin with. In other words,
finding the work to be a work made for hire reduces the scope of
copyright protection. At the same time, finding a work not to be a
work made for hire may have a huge impact in some problematic
242cases. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. can serve as a good
example. In this case, the district court's decision finding for the
238 The question whether it is a good idea for the government to own copyright
in governmental works, or whether it is better that such a work be entitled to no
protection, is an interesting question but beyond the scope of this article. See
Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials,
23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81 (2000); Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (2003); Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright
Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incentive or Double
Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 613 (2004).
239 Of course, one can argue that the basic purpose of not entitling the
government with copyright was to allow free access to governmental work and
that the suggested interpretation weakens this end. However, there are many
examples where countries and governmental agencies do have ownership upon
the creation of copyrighted work, including Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom.
240 17 U.S.C. § 101. For an elaborated analysis of VARA in the context of work
made for hire, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the
Visual Artists Rights Act Got It Wrong, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 741 (2007). For a
discussion of the legislative history of VARA, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
241 Nor are there any other moral rights under U.S. copyright law. In some cases
the author might be entitled to similar, but more limited rights under the Lanham
Act. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). For an
elaborated analysis in the context of moral rights, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Author's Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of
"Paternity"?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 379 (2005); and Rick Mortensen,
D.L after Dastar: Protecting Creators' Moral Rights Through Creative
Lawyering, Individual Contracts and Collectively Bargained Agreements, 8
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335 (2006).
242 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
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plaintiff that the work was not made for hire243 would have meant
that a building's management would not be able to renovate a
lobby of the building or change it without the plaintiffs'
permission.244 The court's role is to balance these factors one
against the other.
2. Access
The second important element which courts should take
into account, is maintaining public accessibility to a given work.
This element has two aspects: public accessibility to the work after
the copyright protection has expired and public accessibility while
the work is still protected.
When considering accessibility to a work, two things
should be taken into account: the length of the copyright protection
term, and the ease with which the public can access the work. As
for the first, works made for hire have a different length of
protection. Deciding that a work is made for hire might therefore
benefit third parties by granting the public "early access. '245 As for
the ease of access to the work - this depends on the circumstances.
If, for example, the chances are slim that the agent will print and
maintain copies of her work but good that the employer will
disseminate copies, the public would have easier access to the
work if the rights are granted to the employer and the work is
declared a work made for hire. It may therefore, be wise to
distinguish between different kinds of works. For example, an
agent might have a strong claim to the rights in a literary work
because it can be easily posted online for the public to access.
Accessing the work after the copyright protection has
expired, however, is only one aspect of accessibility. The other
aspect is accessibility while the work is still protected. One issue is
physical accessibility: will the agent, being granted the rights, put
the work away in her drawer while the employer would have
243 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (D.N.Y. 1994).
244 In Carter the three plaintiffs were professional sculptors who worked
together. They entered into a one year contract with building management to
build, among other things, a "walk through" sculpture in the lobby, occupying
most of it. The building management had changed and when the new
management wanted to remove the art the artists resisted arguing their work fell
under the protection of VARA. Id. at 312. While the district court granted a
permanent injunction, which enjoined defendants from removing the work, id. at
337, the appellate court reversed, deciding the "walk through" sculpture to be a
work made for hire, and therefore not entitled to the protection of VARA. 71
F.3d at 87-88.
245 See supra note 10.
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printed thousands of copies of it?246 Another issue is whether one
party would be easier to locate and contact when a member of the
public asks for a license to use the work. It seems that the relative
ability and motivation of the agent or the employer to disseminate
the work should be taken into account in deciding which party gets
the copyright.
Transaction costs are an additional aspect of the
accessibility issue. How will the assignment of rights influence the
transaction costs of obtaining a license to use the work? In this
case, courts should take into account considerations similar to
those considered when deciding the status of joint works. 247 The
fact that a work is a joint project of a few agents might tip the scale
towards assigning the rights to the employer248 because this will
reduce the transaction costs involved in dealing with several
people.249 On the other hand, if the project as a whole is only made
by one person the court should be less concerned about transaction
costs. The academic article is a good example of the latter. The
typical article or book is a one-scholar project or at the most, is
written by a small number of authors and therefore poses no
problem in this respect.
250
246 In some situations, the employer can still contract to obtain the work.
However, there will certainly be situations in which transaction costs are too
high for contracting to be possible. When this is the case, giving authorship to
the employee can prevent dissemination of the work.
247 See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2004);
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1991).
248 And indeed the second part of the work made for hire definition deals with a
similar problem, only with regard to an enumerated number of categories. It is
however important to notice that many factual scenarios will not be covered by
the second category.
249 Often times a member of the public wants to get a license to the work in its
entirety. Entitling the agents with individual rights in fragments of the work
might expose the work to the tragedy of the anticommons. See, e.g., Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Scd. 698 (1998); see generally
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (setting forth the theory
of the anticommons).
250 Moreover, in the case of joint authors, entitling the university with the rights
will not necessarily solve the problem because different professors might belong
to different institutions. For example, in a joint article by Yale and Stanford
professors, which institution gets the rights? Another interesting scenario is
when the same professor works for different institutions, at the same or at
different times (either different universities as in a case of a visiting professor or
when she receives a grant). In the latter case finding for the employer again
raises the question of which institution will have the rights the institution in
which the professor had started to work on the project, the institution in which
she continued, the institution in which she finalized it or all of the above. Since
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3. Derivative Works
Accessibility concerns not only the public but also the
author herself. The analysis should also consider how the
assignment of rights affects future works created by the same
author. Courts should bear in mind the fact that if the work is
deemed a work made for hire, the agent may encounter difficulties
in creating similar works in the future,251 since these new works
may be considered derivative works and deemed to infringe the
employer's copyrights.252
The courts must not only consider which party can best
make derivative works, but also how to prevent one party from
hindering the creation of derivative works by the other. For
example, when someone is hired to write a small part of a much
bigger computer program, finding the work not to be a work made
for hire may cause the employer difficulties when using this small
program for the creation of the bigger program or new versions of
it in the future. In order to do so, the employer would have to ask
the author's permission for each of these new uses. 253 This, of
professors are peripatetic in their nature finding for the employers will raise
transaction costs because the same work, book or article, will have several
owners instead of one.
251 Unlike in the United States, in the United Kingdom and other countries, the
author is entitled to some privileges with regard to their future works. Section 64
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, titled "[m]aking of subsequent
works by same artist," provides that "[w]here the author of an artistic work is
not the copyright owner, he does not infringe the copyright by copying the work
in making another artistic work, provided he does not repeat or imitate the main
design of the earlier work." C. 48, pt. 1, c. 111, § 64.
252 It seems that while deciding issues of copyright protection in other contexts
the court is aware of this problem and therefore takes the affect on future works
by the same author into account. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). In Warner Bros., the
Ninth Circuit held that the literary character of Sam Spade was not
copyrightable because it did not constitute "the story being told." Id. at 950. The
court opined that if "the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the
story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the copyright." Id.
However, the court's decision may be explained by its concerns over future
works made by the same author or new licensees. If the character is not
protected on its own granting an exclusive license in a novel will not restrict the
author from using the same characters in future novels, producing more
incentives to create new works.
253 Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505-06 (2001) (considering
ownership of copyrights to articles collected in larger database). Entitling the
employer with a "shop right" could solve some aspects of the problem but
unlike in the area of patent law a "shop right" provision did not find its way to
the 1976 Act. See Dreyfuss, supra note 234, at 638 ("[Congress] could have
enacted a 'shop right' doctrine similar to that used in patent law for works
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course, is not an efficient outcome, and therefore should push the
courts towards giving the employer the rights.
The issue of derivative works may complicate matters even
further because it not only affects the creation of future works but
also the status of the work in question. Take for example the
following scenario: an artist, who has a unique style, produced a
few sculptures in the past. After several years, she is hired to
produce another sculpture. For the sake of argument, we will
assume that in this case most parameters of the CCNV case are in
favor of the employer so the court will decide the issue of
copyright authorship and ownership in her favor. What would be
the consequence of such a ruling? If the new sculpture is quite
similar to the old sculptures, it could be considered a derivative
work. The right, however, to create derivatives belongs to the
copyright owner of the old works.254 Now, if we assume the
employer is the owner of the new work, the agent might claim that
the new work infringes her old works because she gave no
25permission to create a derivative work.  If this is indeed the case,
not only would the employer be an infringer but, because the work
is illegally based on the old work, the illegality pervades the new
work and therefore she is not entitled to copyright protection at
all.256
4. Expanding Access Considerations
Furthermore, assume one of the involved parties is likely to
provide free access to the work, or charge considerably lower
created through the intellectual forces of the employee. Under this doctrine, the
employer would have the limited right to use the work for purposes consistent
with his business, but the employee would retain all other rights, including those
necessary to safeguard the social values of the work." (footnotes omitted)).
254 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2008).
255 One can solve this complication by arguing that the "employee" had given an
implied license to the employer by the mere fact of the employment but this
does not have to be the case; especially if the employee is not aware of her
rights. After all, it is the owner's privilege to provide license to the work.
Moreover, even if she "agreed" to give the employer a license to use her old
works (under the implied licenses doctrine, see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03 (1988)), the copyright act
allows her to renounce or terminate it.
256 One can think of a more complicated scenario in which the artist, while
creating these sculptures, was not a private contractor but was working for a
different employer. Now the former employer will bring a suit against the
current employer for violating its rights in the derivative work. While in the
artist example this may seem far fetched, in other industries such as software
and high-tech this scenario is rather common.
2008-2009
56
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 11 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol11/iss1/3
TORT MADE FOR HIRE - RECONSIDERING THE CCNV
CASE
royalties for its use.257 A party might even give up her rights
altogether and contribute the work to the public domain.258 Or,
perhaps a party would keep only some of the rights while giving a
free license to the public to use the rest.259 Should courts take these
possibilities into account when deciding who gets the rights? And
if so, should these factors tip the test?
Considering access from the public's perspective, it is
certainly better to entitle the party who is willing to give up its
rights or charge less for their use. One of the paradigmatic
examples is works created for the US government. Finding a work
to be a government-created work made for hire means that the
work is not protected at all and the public at large can get free
access to it. On the other hand, if the work was made by an
independent contractor, she will get the rights. The independent
contractor can then keep the rights or assign them to the US
government. In either case, the public will be restricted from free
access to these works.260
5. Applicability of These Criteria
It is true that some of these factors do not coincide and
therefore pull the assignment of rights in different directions.
Sometimes there is an inherent contradiction among them, whereas
at other times a conflict will be created because of the facts of a
specific case. For example, if the incentives argument is in favor of
the employer whereas the access argument is in favor of the agent,
the court would have to somehow weigh these considerations
against each other. The effect of the work's status on the right to
terminate transfers and on the term of protection is another
example. Consider the length of protection: if the work is a work
made for hire, the length of protection will be, on average, shorter
257 Another interesting criterion is the chance that one party will enforce its
rights or bring a copyright violation suit, as estimated by the court. The problem
with copyright protection is that, unlike patents, one does not have to actively
act in order to obtain the rights. From the moment of creation, works are
protected. Therefore, the initial assignment of rights is important because some
authors, who gain rights in new works, will not actively pursue them for many
different reasons. If the chances of enforcement are slim, society will have a de
facto free access to the work without having to pay the social price.
258 Some authors, for example, believe they should be remunerated for their
initial investment but then their work should be dedicated to the public domain.
See, e.g., Creative Commons, Founders' Copyright, http://creativecommons.org/
projects/founderscopyright (last visited December 12, 2008).
259 See, e.g., id.
260 One should note however that this outcome will also affect the authors'
incentives. See supra Part V.B.1.
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than if it is not.261 This, of course, will affect both the issue of
incentives and the issue of public access. Whether the work is a
work made for hire also affects the right to terminate the transfer of
rights after 35 years. If the work is made for hire, the employee is
not entitled to terminate the transfer at any time even if she
obtained initial ownership by contract. This, of course, may affect
her incentives to create to begin with. The status of the work
affects both the length of protection and the right to terminate
transfer and therefore should be carefully taken into account.
Unfortunately, I am unable to provide an easy solution to
the work made for hire problem. In any given case the court would
probably have to evaluate the relative weight of the incentives and
public access based on its facts. This, however, should not be
discouraging. Courts often conduct this kind of analysis - both in
the copyright area 62 and in other areas of law.263 Judges are
accustomed to assessing the relative importance of various factors
in any given case. The law will then evolve in a case by case,
common law manner, similar to the judicial evolution of the fair
use analysis.
A possible objection to my suggestion to focus on
incentives and public access is that the agency test is simply more
efficient to administer. In the agency test, after all, the courts
evaluate some bright line issues such as: health benefits, tax
treatment and where the employee actually worked. To counter this
I would argue, first, that it is a matter of debate whether the agency
test is indeed simpler to administer. As I discussed above, the
multiplicity of factors in the agency test has proven difficult for the
courts to weigh and consider in any consistent fashion. Thus, the
disputing parties put their energy into gathering phalanxes of facts
regarding where the employee worked, at what times and so on.
Meanwhile, the courts puzzle through the data without a guiding
star - a sense of what the 'right' solution should be. Certainly this
is not administrative efficiency at its best. Second, and more
important, any putative administrative convenience of the agency
test should not matter because it is simply the wrong test. The fact
261 The term of protection for works made for hire and "regular" works is
different. See supra note 10. Given the life expectancy in the United States
(seventy-eight years), it seems that real authors are, on the average, entitled to
longer protection than employers.
262 This tension is part of the standard fair use analysis. See e.g., Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Harper & Row,
Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
263 Thus, for example, in the area of tort law courts have to balance between
deterrence and loss spreading considerations, which often times pull in different
directions. See e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 162.
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that we don't have a bright line solution should not discourage us
from focusing on incentives and access parameters. Similarly,
flipping a coin is easy but is unlikely to come up with the right
solution.
Focusing on incentives and access can shed light on cases,
such as CCNV, which have proven confusing to courts. While
applying the agency test provided the courts with no good intuition
on how to resolve CCNV, focusing on incentives and access
simplifies the issue and clearly favors the artist, encouraging the
creative party promotes the creation of more works. In CCNV,
Reid was the sculptor and therefore the party to be encouraged. In
contrast, CCNV was not in the business of making sculptures and
was unlikely to create any more works. 264
In regard to the issue of accessibility, CCNV intended to
exhibit the work across the country, which would have provided
the public easier access to the work. On the other hand, however,
this may have come at the expense of the physical condition of the
statue. Naturally, if the statute had broken apart, no one would
have had access to it. Again, this factor cuts in favor of Reid
because the sculptor was in a better position to evaluate the
physical strength of the work.
What about administrative costs involved in getting a
license to use the work? This is a close call because the work was
not a joint work which would involve many parties in licensing
transactions. Whether CCNV or Reid won the copyright, each
party was only a single entity which would present relatively low
transaction costs. Nevertheless, the balance tips to the side of the
artist. One can argue that if the artist is a well known figure and the
public recognizes his style, it would be easier for the public to
locate the artist than CCNV. Therefore, the artist should have the
rights .2 5
Distinctive style takes us to the issue of derivative works.
We would like the artist to have as broad and as easy an access to
his works as possible. If the artist has to ask for CCNV's
permission every time he wants to build a new statue which is
based on the old one, or is highly influenced by it, he may, due to
high transaction costs, forgo the idea of creating that new work
264 A more in depth analysis would be needed to confirm this it is possible that,
as an artist, Reid would not need an economic incentive to create, and might be
better off with an incentive given to CCNV that results in his hiring. Whatever
the outcome, this analysis should be conducted keeping these incentives in
mind, not tort motivations.
265 It is possible that, if Reid is unknown, the sculpture would be more
identifiable with CCNV. In this case, administrative costs in licensing would
weigh against the artist.
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altogether. This would limit his set of tools and negatively affect
the variety of works he can create. Another issue in derivatives is
the fact that Reid's current work (the homeless statute) might be a
derivative of his previous works. If the current statue is a
derivative work and CCNV got the copyright to it, CCNV might be
liable for derivative infringement for displaying the statue. Hence,
all or most of the above considerations tend to support a
conclusion that copyright should be vested with the artist.
CONCLUSION
It has been more than 15 years since the Supreme Court set
the test for the interpretation of the Work Made for Hire Doctrine.
The test was based on the common law and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. In pursuing this test the Supreme Court
emphasized the fact that uniform and predictable standards must be
established as a matter of federal law. In contrast to the law of any
particular state, the role of common law agency was to provide, as
the court explained, a cohesive and predictable test. However, as
explained in this paper, not only did this test come with a very high
price tag, compromising many important interests, uniformity and
predictability were not achieved. As the analysis suggests in this
paper, it is easy to see that the common law of agency, as reflected
in the Restatement Second and implemented by the courts in the
context of copyright law, does not provide a good fit.
Furthermore, agency law keeps evolving. Only recently, in
2005, the Restatement (Third) of Agency was adopted.266 Reading
the Restatement (Third) one cannot avoid the conclusion that there
is a strong tendency to further expand employers' liability.267
266 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006).
267 The general theme suggests an extension of the definitions of "employee"
and the "scope of the employment" to include more cases within the boundaries
of the employment making the employer liable in more cases. According to the
Restatement (Third), the definition of the scope-of-employment in its new
version differs from its antecedent in Restatement (Second) of Agency, sections
228 and 229, because it is phrased in more general terms. The previous
formulation did not encompass "the working circumstances of many managerial
and professional employees and others whose work is not so readily cabined by
temporal or spatial limitations." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt.
b (2006). This tendency can also be observed by the fact that the new definition
applies even to volunteers. Where the Restatement (Second) had a general
section about Person Serving Gratuitously, stating that "[o]ne who volunteers
services without an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of
the one accepting such services," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225,
the Restatement (Third) of Agency states explicitly that "the fact that work is
performed gratuitously does not relieve a principal of liability," RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(b). Thus, even where the employer is a non-profit
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Citing cases268 and other references it seems the Restatement
(Third) criticizes decisions in which the status of employee and
"scope of employment" were narrowly defined. This expansion is
based on the strong connection between the employer's vicarious
liability and its underlying rational in the law of torts.269 The
reporter's notes specifically mention the fact that the employer's
right to control employee's action emerges as a central justification
and limiting principle for vicarious liability in accounts within
philosophy as well as economics. 270 The notes also mention the
268 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. c (2006) (criticizing, and
supporting other references that do so, cases that fail to interpret the "scope of
employment" broadly enough to incorporate actions that may also count as
negligently or intentionally tortious).
269 A good example is provided by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The Court considered whether an employer
should be liable for the sexual harassment suit of an employee under Title VII of
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), but the Court provided an
illuminating analysis about how the elastic phrase "scope of the employment"
may be used to include "all which the court wishes to put into it." Id. at 797
(quoting Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in
WARREN A. SEAVEY, STUDIES TN AGENCY 129, 155 (1949)). According to the
Court, while older cases treated smoking by employees during working hours as
an act outside the scope of employment, newer cases held smoking on the job to
fall within that scope. The Court observed that:
It is not that employers formerly did not authorize smoking
but have now begun to do so, or that employees previously
smoked for their own purposes but now do so to serve the
employer. We simply understand smoking differently now and
have revised the old judgments about what ought to be done
about it.
Id. at 797. In the context of harassment the Court said the following:
The proper analysis ... calls not for a mechanical application
of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restatement
but rather an enquiry into the reasons that would support a
conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within the
scope of a supervisor's employment, and the reasons for the
opposite view.
Id. (citation omitted).
270 According to the reporter's comment, "[i]f a person has no right to control an
actor and exercises no control over the actor, the actor is not an agent."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006). Thus, if the agent is
working under the supervision of two employers the restatement suggests that
liability should be allocated to the employer in the better position to take
measures to prevent the injury suffered by the third party. "The employee's
intention severs the basis for treating the employee's act as that of the employer
in the employee's interaction with the third party." Id. The Restatement (Third)
rejects foreseeability as an alternative test to intent on the ground that
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fact that in general, the employer stands to profit from the
employee's services and that he has an ability to control and deter
misbehavior as long as the employee is not actuated by purely
personal motives. 271 Thus, the tortious rationale has become more
apparent and dominates the scope of the employment test more
than ever before.272 At the same time the restatement's reference to
copyright law is minimal.273
Dealing with tortious liability in an industrial world, the
expansion of employer's liability and the strengthening of the tort
related rationales seems a sound policy. The same does not
necessarily hold to copyright law. In the context of copyright, this
expansion means the employer is more likely to get the
entitlement.
What makes sense in torts in terms of deterrence and justice
considerations makes less sense in the realm of copyrights. When
one attempts to rationalize copyright's initial assignment of rights
other rationales come to mind and should govern. The expansion
of the term "employee" and "scope of the employment" will only
accidently serve the delicate balances of copyright law. Therefore,
courts should not follow it blindfolded. Both the Supreme Court
and federal circuit courts have articulated more than once that even
foreseeability may penalize an employer who has taken reasonable precautions
against employee misconduct. Id. cmt. b. In such cases, imposing a duty of care
is inconsistent with the central objective of contemporary negligence law, which
is to create incentives toward efficient measures to reduce the occurrence of
torts.
271 In the latter cases the employer's practical ability to prevent the harm is
slight.
272 Unlike the previous version, the Restatement (Third) has made explicit the
fact that the employer's ability to prevent damages justifies the imposition of
liability. According to the current Restatement, the employer's ability to
exercise control over his employee's work-related conduct enables him to take
measures to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct, while in stark contrast,
when an employee's tortious conduct is outside the range of activity that an
employer may control, subjecting the employer to liability would not provide
him with incentives to take measures to reduce the incidence of such tortious
conduct. Moreover, the restatement regards the employer's ability to insure as
another justification for the imposition of liability. According to the restatement,
for an employer to insure against a risk of liability, the risk must be at least to
some degree ascertainable and quantifiable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF AGENCY
§ 7.07 (2006).
273 "Whether an employee acted within the scope of employment in committing
a tort is also relevant in statutory contexts. The common-law test of scope of
employment may be relevant but not dispositive in determining whether an
employee's literary, artistic, or other creative work constitutes a work for hire
for purposes of federal copyright legislation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (2006).
2008-2009
62
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 11 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol11/iss1/3
TORT MADE FOR HIRE - RECONSIDERING THE CCNV
CASE
in cases where the law specifically refers to agency law,
modifications should be made, based on the inherent goals and
purposes the law strives to achieve. 4  This should definitely be
the case in copyright law when there is no such direct reference. It
seems the Restatement (Third) itself moves in this direction.275
One can only hope that courts will regard the new
Restatement as an opportunity to part ways from the tort based
definitions of "employee" and "scope of the employment." Even if
courts continue to feel obligated to comply with the time honored
test, the Third Restatement may improve matters. Perhaps the
Third Restatement's more flexible definition will provide an
opportunity for courts to re-interpret the test to better reflect
copyright law's principles.
274 Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 500 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We
decide whether to apply agency principles to establish liability under a federal
statute in accordance with the degree to which such principles effectuate the
policies of the statute. This is not dissimilar from the rules of common law,
where there are different types of agency relationships, and the degree to which
the actions of the agent are attributed to the principal vary for each. Thus, if we
are to import any agency principles to the test for WARN Act intercorporate
liability, we must do so selectively, with an eye to effectuating WARN Act
purposes." (citations omitted)).
275The Restatement indeed insists on the principal's right to control the agent,
but even within the meaning of the Restatement the content and the specific
meaning of control can vary. For example, "a person may be an agent although
the principal lacks the right to control the full range of the agent's activities,
how the agent uses time, or the agent's exercise of professional judgment."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006). See also Introduction
to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY para. 18 (2006).
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